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Introduction
‘Canada is  America’s hat.’  In the popular webcomic ‘Scandinavia and the World’, 
where countries are depicted as human characters, this famous line is often taken 
literally. In one episode1, USA fantasizes about proudly wearing a maple leaf hat, 
while Canada dreams of himself as a bigger wrestler overpowering the USA. In the 
end,  the  ‘normal’  situation  is  resumed: the  USA,  muscular,  sun-tanned  and  big, 
triumphantly carrying a sighing Canada on top of his head. A little pink heart springs 
from USA’s temple. In these few simplistic drawings, a fairly accurate summary of 
the extremely complicated US-Canadian relationship is given. Following the comic’s 
narrative, the relationship can be characterized by closeness, as depicted when both 
characters are in close physical contact in all situations, by mutual ambition, as both 
countries dream of having power over the other, by Canada –at least geographically- 
holding the USA in a lock-grip and eventually, by the USA getting his way in the 
actual situation.
One  important  feature  of  the  US-Canadian  relationship  is  missed  in  this 
caricature, though. This is the deep and comprehensive mutual interdependence of 
both  countries.  Although  the  USA  clearly  is  the  major  power  of  the  two,  both 
countries  are  inextricably  connected to  each other  and highly  dependent  on one 
another. This thesis deals with this relationship on a specific topic: the Arctic. Both 
countries  have  Arctic  territory:  for  Canada,  all  of  the  northernmost  part  of  the 
mainland and the complete Arctic Archipelago north of it. In the USA, the better part 
of  Alaska  is  Arctic.  With  both  countries  in  such  a  close  bilateral  relationship 
characterized by mutual,  if  unequal,  interdependence,  Canada and the USA truly 
have  each  other  in  an  ‘icy  grip’:  a  delicate  balance  between  sovereignty  and 
interdependence.  Especially  in  Canada,  this  balance  is  a  point  of  concern:  any 
increase  in  interdependence  can  be  viewed  as  a  potential  threat  to  Canadian 
sovereignty.  The  US,  often  having  more  determining  power,  fears  less  for  its 
sovereignty, although policy freedom is a concern there as well.
One typical feature of the US-Canadian relationship found in literature is a 
10:1 ratio of the US compared to Canada. This ratio counts for number of inhabitants 
and crucial economic figures as GDP and, as one author dryly notes, homicide rate.2 
This ratio makes Canada clearly a minor partner relative to the US, but not at all  
insignificant.  The  USA  is  the  dominant  partner,  usually  defining  the  eventual 
outcome of (bilateral) issues and debates to a larger extent than Canada. However, 
this does not mean that Canada is powerless in the relationship and simply follows 
US’  rule  and  directions.  Canada  is  very  important  to  the  US  in  matters  like 
1 Scandinavia and the World, ‘A Matter of Perspective’ http://satwcomic.com/matter-of-perspective
2 Herd Thompson, J. and Randall, S. ‘Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies’ (Athens, 2002) p. 
309
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continental security, energy and trade. In some of the discussed Arctic matters, it 
seems Canada has more leverage perhaps than in other issues. This may be because 
of the high relevance the Arctic has in Canada, compared to the usually low priority 
Arctic matters get south of the 49th parallel.
The US-Canadian relationship is called the most intensive in the world by one 
author3.  This is  hardly surprising when considering the fact that  over half  of  the 
populations of both countries live within a day’s ride of the border.4 However, the 
relationship  often  seems  more  important  to  Canadians  than  to  their  southern 
neighbors. Like almost any (western) country in the world, Canada claims to have a 
‘special relationship’ with the US. This special relationship has been actively pursued 
by Canadian governments since the 2nd World War. The amount of traffic in persons, 
goods, energy, investments and money between the two countries suggests this is 
correct. The USA however, if recognizant of the unique size of the relationship, does 
not seem to be very much convinced of the uniqueness of its character: according to 
author, Canadians simply don’t recognize they are not that special to the US.5 
In  order  to  analyze  the  relationship  specifically  concerning  the Arctic,  the 
period  of  the  last  decade  of  the  Cold  War  and  the  first  decade  afterwards  is 
considered:  roughly  1980-2000 (although  this  demarcation  is  not  always  strictly 
adhered to). The Arctic is a relevant, distinct facet of US-Canadian relations. Some 
remarkable conflicts,  but also far-reaching cooperation between the two countries 
can be seen in Arctic matters. The Arctic is also a unique region were problems and 
difficulties arise that can be seen nowhere else on the planet. The end of the Cold 
War, is often seen as a pivotal point in world politics of the late 20 th century. This 
thesis  seeks  to  assess  the  relationship  between  Canada  and  the  United  States 
specifically on Arctic matters, focusing on the period around the end of the Cold War. 
What makes the Arctic so relevant a facet of the US-Canadian relationship? 
First of all, the relevance of the Arctic for the public, politicians and policy-makers is 
different for either country. For many Canadians, the Arctic is a very important, even 
identity-defining  matter.  For  most  Americans,  the  Arctic  is  far  less  important. 
Whether they actually  ‘see the region as a foreign place, rather than a national  
frontier, a depopulated place synonymous with the ends of the earth’6 remains to be 
seen, but the area is certainly not helping define a national identity the way as can 
be seen in Canada. American interest in the Arctic has largely focused on issues 
3 Maclean, G. (ed.)‘Canada and the United States: A Relationship at a Crossroads?’ (Winnipeg, 2005) 
p.6
4 Ibid. p.8
5 Herd Thompson, J. and Randall, S. ‘Canada and the United States’ p. 324-325
6 Heininen, L. and Nicol, H. ‘The Importance of Northern Dimension Foreign Policies in the Geopolitics of 
the Circumpolar North’ in: ‘Geopolitics 12’ (2007) p. 150
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taking place in the north, like defense and natural resource extraction, rather than 
on the area itself. 
Canada has found a positive definition of nationality in the north. Canada is a 
relatively young state, gaining full  independence from Great Britain only in 1931. 
Canadian identity has often been described as being ‘not American’.7 This negative 
definition however, does not define what Canada is, and what Canadians are, it only 
defines what they are not. By stressing its northern identity, Canadians have found a 
positive definition of their country: Canada is a northern country. Northern elements 
have long been part of their national iconography, whether it is in the form of a 
moose  or  a  beaver,  or  Inuit  symbols.  The  2010  ‘Statement  on  Canada’s  Arctic  
Foreign  Policy’  even  starts  with  the  very  words:  ‘The  Arctic  is  fundamental  to 
Canada’s  national  identity  (..)  The  Arctic  is  embedded  in  Canadian  history  and  
culture, and in the Canadian soul.’8 Not only is this a very distinctive feature of the 
country, it is also quite unique. 
What  then  does  ‘Arctic’  mean,  which  region  is  exactly  the  ‘Arctic’?  The 
relevant  geological  area  is  obviously  that  above  the  Arctic  circle  (66º  northern 
latitude). From this latitude on, the polar night (the sun not rising above the horizon 
for  at  least 24 hours continuously in  winter)  and polar day (the opposite  during 
summer)  can  be  observed.  However,  a  different  definition  of  Arctic  is  used  in 
different  places.  Because  of  warm gulf  streams  reaching  Arctic  Europe,  the  66º 
latitude demarcation is usually felt to be too southern in those areas, although it is 
adhered to partly because of its clear definition. The tree line and 10ºC isotherm 
(indicating the lowest average summer temperature) lies north of 66º in northern 
Scandinavia and western Russia. In the colder land climate of eastern Russia, and 
even more so in North America and Greenland, 66º is considered too far northward 
to be a proper demarcation. There, as well as in Iceland, a latitude of 60º is used to 
define  the  Arctic.  This  mirrors  the  60º  southern latitude  used  to  demarcate  the 
Antarctic. 60º North is still north of the tree line and 10º isotherm in many places, 
though.9
7 Herd Thompson, J. and Randall, S. ‘Canada and the United States’ p. 309
8 Government of Canada, ‘Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy’ (Ottawa, 2010) p.3
9 Keskitalo, C. ‘International Region-Building: Development of the Arctic as an International Region’ in: 
‘Cooperation and Conflict 42’ (2007) p.190
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Map 1: ‘Arctic Region’ Map source: Pharand, D. ‘The Arctic Waters and the Northwest Passage: A Final 
Revisit’ in: ‘Ocean Development & International Law 38’ (2007) p.54
When seen on a regular map with the north on top, the Arctic may seem a 
frozen cap on top of the world. Circumpolar relationship are difficult to grasp from 
that perspective. This changes when the north pole, instead of being the uppermost 
part of a map, is depicted at the center of the map. The Arctic ocean then becomes a 
Mediterranean sea surrounded by five littoral states: the USA, Canada, Denmark (via 
Greenland) and Norway. Iceland, Finland and Sweden also have Arctic territory and 
are considered Arctic states, albeit not littoral to the Arctic ocean. 
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The Arctic ocean is an ocean unique in character, because it is permanently 
frozen for  the  largest  part.  This  means that  navigating  the  Arctic  ocean is  very 
difficult.  Ice-covered land and ice-covered sea  are  difficult  to  discern,  giving the 
untrained eye the idea of an endless frozen waste. Navigating the Arctic is, however, 
very much possible. The southern parts of the Arctic ocean, especially waters close 
to the Russian mainland and those in the Canadian Archipelago, have increasingly 
become open to traffic. Whether because of global warming or natural causes, the 
Arctic ice cover is retreating. The opening up of the Arctic ocean for shipping brings 
up complicated issues of sovereignty and responsibility and especially heated debate 
between the US and Canada. 
Between the Pacific and the Atlantic oceans, a passage through the Canadian 
Archipelago is possible. Though not yet economically viable, this route may become 
highly relevant for international shipping in the future. A dispute between Canada 
and  the  United  States  exists  on  whether  this  route  should  be  considered  an 
international strait  or –as Canada maintains- waters under Canadian sovereignty. 
This issue, as well as a sea-border dispute between the two countries in the Beaufort 
sea, makes territorial issues a relevant ‘Arctic’ topic in the US-Canadian relationship. 
Not  only  sovereignty  is  at  stake  there,  but  also  environmental  concerns  and 
questions of responsibility, as well as economical issues and energy security, as the 
Arctic seabed contains large estimated amounts of hydrocarbons.
A look at the Arctic centered around the north pole also make another issue 
very  clear,  which  was  especially  important  during  the  Cold  War:  the  shortest 
distance between the US and the Soviet Union was via the Arctic. The US and Soviet 
Union could actually see each other’s territory across the Bering sea. During the Cold 
War,  it  was  often noted that  the shortest  route  for  Soviet  missiles,  bombers  or 
submarines to north American territory would be over or through the Arctic ocean. 
Since  Canada is  positioned between the USA and the  Arctic  ocean,  the  bilateral 
relation was for a large part dominated by security issues during the Cold War. The 
end  of  the  Cold  War  shifted  and  changed  many  priorities  in  the  global  political 
agenda of every country in the world. With the US as the only remaining superpower 
after 1989, this event had a huge impact. Because the Arctic  is a geographically 
defined subject, such a change in geopolitics must have had some sort of influence 
on  US  policy,  especially  concerning  Canada,  a  Cold  War  ally  and  geopolitically 
important for the US during the Cold War. 
Another major topic in the relationship between the US and Canada where the 
Arctic  plays  an important  role is  energy.  With Canada as the most important oil 
supplier for the US and the US as the number one consumer of Canadian oil, both 
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countries are extremely interdependent in this field. The US depends on Canada for a 
major  part  of  its  oil  supply,  while  the  Canadian  economy  is  for  a  large  part 
dependent  on  American  oil  dollars.  As  is  already  mentioned,  large  quantities  of 
hydrocarbons (mainly natural gas, but also significant amounts of oil) can be found 
in the Arctic. Exploitation of these resources however, is difficult in the unforgiving 
Arctic  climate  and  environmental  risks  are  high.  With  energy  security  as  an 
important concern in both the US and Canada, issues concerning energy are very 
relevant to both the US and Canada and thus, to the bilateral relationship. Some 
ambitious energy infrastructure projects amount to far-reaching cooperation between 
the two countries, which brings up questions of sovereignty and policy freedom in a 
very tangible way.
During the last decades of the 20th century, realization struck firmly that the 
environment required protection from anthropogenic  pollution.  In the unique  and 
volatile Arctic, this became especially clear. Since national boundaries are hardly of 
consequence in these issues, cooperation was soon felt to be crucial. Environmental 
concerns  are  often  difficult  to  combine  with  economic  interests,  especially  when 
natural resources are concerned. This leads not only to internal disputes, but also 
makes for bilateral frictions. However, intensive cooperation can be seen in this area 
between Canada and the United States. Starting from environmental cooperation, a 
regional  approach to  Arctic  matters  also  evolves,  involving all  Arctic  states.  This 
regional approach is an important facet of the bilateral relationship between Canada 
and  the  US  as  well,  as  both  countries  have  a  different  approach  to  the  newly 
developing regional cooperation.
All these issues appear to be in some way interrelated. Territorial claims are 
intimately  connected  to  environmental  concerns  and  regionalism,  environmental 
issues are connected to energy, which has an important security facet, which in turn 
connects back to sovereignty concerns. All these topics reflect a delicate balance for 
both countries  between interdependence and sovereignty.  The highly  complicated 
US-Canadian relationship is too large to tackle as a whole. The Arctic, as a distinct 
region is used as a case-study to analyze this complicated relationship in a unique, 
but clearly defined setting. This approach leads to several question which this thesis 
seeks to ask and answer. How relevant is the Arctic for both countries and why? How 
is that reflected in the four chosen focal points of territory, security,  energy and 
environment and regional governance? For each of the four focal points, the question 
is then asked what both countries’ interests and priorities were and how interactions 
between  both  countries  have  evolved  during  and  after  the  Cold  War.  This  then 
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answers the question for each topic in what way (if any) the end of the Cold War has 
influenced the US-Canadian relationship on Arctic matters.
One important topic is not addressed by a separate chapter, but is relevant in 
almost  all  topics  and,  indeed  in  all  Arctic  matters.  This  concerns  indigenous 
peoples.10 After  a  difficult  period  of  forced  integration  in  the  early  20th century, 
Canadian  indigenous  peoples  have  gone  through  a  comprehensive  emancipation 
process, eventually leading to the establishment of the partly self-governed territory 
of Nunavut in 1999. Although some indigenous groups live across the Canadian-
Alaskan and southern Canadian border, indigenous concerns have not been a major 
issues in US-Canadian relations in itself. However, as Canada has taken on a leading 
role in circumpolar cooperation, the ‘Canadian perspective’ on indigenous peoples’ 
issues and indeed in the definition of the Arctic has become the predominant school. 
This perspective however, differs from the US perspective on indigenous peoples.
According to one author writing on Canadian indigenous people’s policy, the 
contemporary  definition  of  the  Arctic  as  a  whole  is  modeled  after  the  Canadian 
understanding  of  it:  an area where the  dominant  concerns are  environment and 
indigenous peoples.11 Those two topics are intimately related as well: the first people 
to  notice  the  effects  of  environmental  change  or  problems  are  those  whose 
subsistence is based on the land surrounding them. Since indigenous emancipation 
in both Alaska and Canada has taken off, indigenous peoples have begun to assert 
their  claims to ancestral  lands.  In both countries,  these claims have lead to the 
acquisition of tracks of land by indigenous peoples, giving them rights to decide on 
the use of the land, benefit from its exploitation, etc. Especially in the energy sector, 
this has had its effects. Pipeline projects crossing indigenous peoples’ lands have 
encountered problems when indigenous peoples protested against the use of their 
lands,  but  also,  indigenous  peoples  have  formed  consortiums  cooperating  with 
energy  companies  in  order  to  benefit  from  the  riches  their  lands  hold.12 In 
circumpolar cooperation, indigenous peoples have also played a major part and been 
a major topic.
A lot has been written about the US and Canadian Arctic policies, and a lot has been 
written about US-Canadian relations. However, a specific  account of US-Canadian 
policies  concerning the Arctic  is  as yet missing.  Most  literature is  either about a 
10 The peoples of the Arctic go by various different names: native peoples or native Alaskans (in the US), 
aboriginal peoples, first nations (in Canada) and sometimes Eskimo’s (in the US) or Inuit. Since some 
disagreement exists about which term to use and different terms are used in the US and Canada, here 
the neutral ‘indigenous peoples’ is used to describe the original inhabitants of the Arctic already 
present before European colonization.
11 Keskitalo, C. ‘International Region-Building’ p.202  
12 Stern, P. ‘Hunting for Hydrocarbons: Representations of Indigeneity in Reporting on the New Mackenzie 
Valley Pipeline’ in: ‘American Review of Canadian Studies 37’ (2007) p.429
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certain Arctic question, reviewing one or more countries’ policies or stances, or about 
US-Canadian relations in a non-Arctic field. A large part of the literature consulted for 
this thesis reviews only one country’s policies, leaving the making of a comparative 
analysis or assessment of the interactions to the author. Interdependence is stressed 
in some of the literature, applied to certain specific cases, such as energy.13 The fact 
that a large part of the literature was not addressing the bilateral relationship per se, 
means  that  this  important  factor  in  policy  making  was  often  not  addressed  or 
perhaps not recognized enough.
Most  literature  on  US-Canadian  relations  is  Canadian.  Because  of  the 
asymmetry in the origins of existing literature, quite often more information is found 
on the Canadian perspective that on that of the US. This is not surprising, given the 
higher priority of the ‘special relationship’ in Canada, compared to the US. Notably, 
in issues on which the USA places a higher priority, such as energy security, more 
American literature can be found.
Government reports are an important original source in any research project 
in political history. Here, the availability of American material was also less than that 
of Canadian texts. This also has to do with the lower priority of Canadian and Arctic 
matters  to  the  US  relative  to  Canada.  In  Canadian  government  reports  on 
international affairs, the United States and the relation to the US usually have a very 
important  place.  In  US  reports,  Canada  understandably  does  not  get  as  much 
attention. Moreover, where Canada produce a new ‘northern’ or Arctic foreign policy 
report every few years, the US simply has a lower priority for Arctic matters and 
therefore does not produce nearly as much source material. This in itself reflects the 
difference in perspective between both countries regarding each other.
The ‘icy grip’ thesis acknowledges the complicated, diverse relationship between the 
US and Canada and recognizes the special dynamics of sovereignty versus 
interdependence involved in it. The Arctic, although a region a-typical in many ways, 
is an interesting case-study for the relationship. Any conclusions drawn from this 
analysis may not be directly applicable to other aspects of the US-Canadian 
relationship, but may certainly help to enrich other analyses and assessments of it, 
providing an interesting, perhaps surprising facet of interactions between the two 
countries. 
13  Gattinger, M. ‘From Government to Governance in the Energy Sector: The States of the Canada-U.S. 
Energy Relationship’ in: ‘American Review of Canadian Studies 35’ (2005) p.322
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Chapter 1: Territorial Issues
The two most intensively cooperating nations in the world disagree on their mutual 
boundaries  in  several  instances,  two of which take place in the Arctic.  One is  a 
dispute about the sea border between western Canada and Alaska in the Beaufort 
Sea and the other by far the largest and most complicated, is the dispute on the 
sovereignty over the waters of the Northwest Passage. 
Ever since ships crossed the Atlantic ocean to explore what we now call the 
Americas, a passage west towards the Pacific has been a dream. Such a passage is 
possible through the Canadian arctic archipelago: the so-called Northwest Passage 
(NWP). The advantages of such a passage are evident: the northern route across the 
continent is some 5.000 nautical miles shorter than the passage through the Panama 
Canal,  cutting shipping time and thus  costs,  and avoiding the Caribbean basin.14 
Transit  became  possible  in  the  second  half  of  the  twentieth  century.  With  the 
possibility  of  transit  came  the  problem  of  jurisdiction  and  sovereignty  over  the 
waters of the Northwest Passage. In the last decades of the 20 th century, the issue 
steadily  became  more  important,  as  the  ice  covering  of  the  Northwest  Passage 
decreased and the Passage became better navigable.
Since the 1930’s, Canadian sovereignty over Arctic land and islands of the 
Arctic  archipelago  was  internationally  recognized.  Sovereignty  over  the  waters 
surrounding the Arctic islands however, is not.15 According to Canada, these waters 
are  internal,  historic  water  over  which  Canada  has  sovereignty  and  jurisdiction. 
According  to  the  United  States,  these  waters,  as  Northwest  Passage,  are  an 
international shipping strait, subject to the law of the high seas, not a single nation’s 
sovereignty.16 The dispute about the NWP is relatively dormant now, but at this point 
still not resolved. 
14 Pharand, D. ‘The Arctic Waters and the Northwest Passage: A Final Revisit’ in: ‘Ocean Development 
and International Law 38’ (2007) p.4
15 Elliot-Meisel,E. ‘Still Unresolved After Fifty Years: The Northwest Passage in Canadian-American 
Relations, 1946-1998’ in: ‘The American Review of Canadian Studies’ (1999) p.407
16 D. Pharand, ‘The Arctic Waters and the Northwest Passage: A Final Revisit’ p.51
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Closely linked to the NWP dispute is a discussion about Canada’s borders with 
the drawing of straight baselines around the outer perimeters of the Canadian Arctic 
archipelago in 1986. This act transformed all waters in the archipelago to internal 
Canadian waters. The drawing of these baselines, as well as the implications for the 
status of the Arctic waters concerned, is disputed by the United States.17
  In  1982,  the  third  United  Nations  Conference  on  the  Law  of  the  Sea 
(UNCLOS) came to a close with the presentation of a treaty. The conference had 
started in 1973, and the convention only entered into force in 1994. In the treaty, 
rules  are  set  to  regulate  jurisdiction  over  coastal  waters,  economic  rights  and 
ecological responsibilities. Both Canada and the United States were heavily involved 
in the writing process of the convention and signed the treaty. However, Canada only 
ratified the treaty in 2003 and the United States has not yet ratified it to date.18 
Because  UNCLOS  is  a  convention  based  on  consensus  of  around  160  nations 
participating in the writing process, many of its regulations are broadly defined and 
open for interpretation. The legal disputes between the United States and Canada 
17 Elliot-Meisel, E. ‘Still Unresolved After Fifty Years’ p.409
18 D. Pharand, ‘The Arctic Waters and the Northwest Passage: A Final Revisit’ p. 5
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Map 2: Straight baselines around the Canadian Arctic Archipelago (red dotted line) and the main routes 
of the Northwest Passage. Map source: Pharand, D. ‘The Arctic Waters and the Northwest Passage: A 
Final Revisit’ in: ‘Ocean Development & International Law 38’ (2007) p. 18
over  the  Arctic  waters  often  center  around  different  interpretations  of  UNCLOS. 
Although the US has not ratified UNCLOS even to this date, the US does recognize it 
as international law and even enforces it.19
The fact that these issues have been able to become so important in US-
Canadian relations,  links back to the other three important  issues of this  paper: 
continental  security,  energy and natural  resources, and ecology. For Canada,  the 
issue  of  Arctic  sovereignty  also  touches  upon  national  identity.  For  Canada, 
sovereignty over Arctic areas, whether land or water (which, as we shall see, may 
not be as distinct in the Arctic as in more moderate temperature zones), is a matter 
of national identity, not just economic or judicial interests. For the United States on 
the other hand, international security and precedent are concerns which make the 
issue important and their position equally steadfast.
According to Canada, the NWP cannot be considered an international strait 
because international navigation has been infrequent and no ‘customary usage’ has 
been established. As Canadian internal waters, ships transiting would be subject to 
the rules of  ‘innocent  passage’,  which  would  oblige  ships  to  show their  flag  and 
require submarines to surface. Although the US welcomed this last point during the 
Cold War, as it would also mean Soviet submarines would have to surface when 
navigating the NWP, the fact that US submarines would be limited in their freedom of 
navigation had prevalence, even during the height of the Cold War.20
Canada had established sovereignty over the land in the Arctic archipelago as 
early as the 1930’s. However, until 1970, Canada claimed as territorial waters only a 
breath of 3 nautical miles from its coast, even though a breath of 12 nautical miles 
had been common by then. Broader straits in between the islands were thus not 
considered to be territorial water from shore to shore. After the 1970 expansion of 
the territorial waters to 12 nautical miles seaward off the coast, the two entrances to 
the Northwest Passage, Barrow Strait to the East and Prince of Wales Strait in the 
West,  were  now considered  territorial  waters,  being  less  than  24  nautical  miles 
wide.21 The decision to extend the territorial waters was made after the transit of the 
US tanker Manhattan in 1969, planned to test the potential of the Northwest Passage 
as a shipping route for the recently discovered oil and gas reserves in Prudhoe Bay 
on the Eastern slopes of Alaska.22 Although the NWP proved to be too difficult for 
19 Ebinger, C. and Zambetakis, E. ‘The Geopolitics of Arctic Melt’ in: ‘International Affairs 85’ (2009) 
p.1223
20 Joyner, C. ‘United States Legislation and the Polar Oceans’ in: ‘Ocean Development & International Law 
29’ (1998) p. 268
21 Elliot-Meisel, E. ‘Politics, Pride and Precedent: The United States and Canada in the Northwest Passage’ 
in: ‘Ocean Development and International Law 40’ (2009) p.211
22 I. Head & P.E. Trudeau, ‘The Canadian Way’ p.27
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commercial shipping at that point, the Manhattan transit did have significant effects 
on Canadian arctic policies.
Manhattan was owned by the Humble Oil Company (later Exxon), and the 
company asked the Canadian government for permission to make the transit, even 
though the NWP was not considered territorial waters by then (because of the 3-mile 
territorial sea still in place by then). A Canadian captain was stationed on board the 
Manhattan and the Canadian Coast Guard accompanied the ship through the ice-
infested  waters  of  the  NWP.  An  American  icebreaker  also  accompanied  the 
Manhattan,  for  which  no  formal  permission  was  asked.  Although  the  Canadian 
government maintained that the transit had nothing to do with the legal status of the 
Arctic waters and a successful transit was in Canada’s best interest, it did become a 
political issue at that point.23 The  Manhattan was supposed to travel only through 
(then) international  waters of  the NWP (straits  wider than 6 nautical  miles, thus 
staying beyond the then valid 3-mile zone), but had to change course into narrower 
waters due to weather and ice conditions. Although the transit was experimental and 
can easily be described as a highly coordinated effort between the two governments 
and the Humble Oil Company, it lead to a huge public outcry in Canada.24
Canadians  felt  the  transit  was  a  violation  of  Canadian  sovereignty  in  the 
Arctic.  Although  cooperation  on  governmental  level  had  been  good,  the  public 
opinion turned against American presence in the Canadian Arctic. According to one 
author  ‘Perception displaced reality with the  Manhattan transit,  and the Canadian 
public and media were convinced, despite government statements, that the voyage  
represented  both  an  insult  to  Canada  and  a  rejection  of  Canada’s  sovereignty  
claims.’25 
Even in  recent,  mainly  Canadian  literature,  the  Manhattan voyage can be 
found described as a challenge to Canada’s sovereignty, even though the sovereignty 
issue had been deliberately  put to one side by both the American  and Canadian 
governments at the time of the transit.26 The following governmental response in 
Canada is  described as ‘both reactive  and concurrently  innovative’27 by Canadian 
scholar Elliot-Meisel. It comprised of several parts: the aforementioned extension of 
the  breath  of  its  territorial  waters  from 3 to  12 nautical  miles  in  1970,  thereby 
adjusting  Canadian  law to  the  international  accepted  norm and  making  the  two 
entrances to the NWP into territorial waters. The other major legislative reaction is 
23 Elliot-Meisel, E. ‘Politics, Pride and Precedent’ p.210
24 Ibid., p. 209-10
Head , I and Trudeau, P. ‘The Canadian Way: Shaping Canada’s Foreign Policy 1968-1984’ (Ottawa, 
1995) p.28
25 Elliot-Meisel, E. ‘Politics, Pride and Precedent’ p.211
26 Shadian, J. ‘In Search of an Identity Canada Looks North’ in: ‘American Review of Canadian Studies 
37’ (2007) p. 332
27 Elliot-Meisel, E. ‘Still Unresolved After Fifty Years’ p. 413
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considered truly innovative by scholars: the 1970 ‘Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention 
Act’ (AWPPA), setting regulations for ships sailing Arctic waters to prevent pollution 
and damage to the Arctic waters and environment. This act applied not only to the 
Arctic  waters between the Arctic  archipelago,  but  also  to the waters  outside the 
Archipelago, which were mostly high seas.28 The act can be considered an assertion 
of ‘pragmatic sovereignty’:  sovereignty over the waters was not formally  claimed 
(yet), but jurisdiction over the waters was established on the basis of pragmatism 
and environmental protection and responsibility, rather than legalistic claims. Prime 
Minister Trudeau maintained that the act was ‘not an assertion of sovereignty’ even 
stating that he wanted the act ‘to withstand the immense Canadian public pressure 
for an assertion of sovereignty’.29
The  official  statements  notwithstanding,  the  American  reaction  was  an 
immediate rejection of AWPPA. A long-standing US priority is global freedom of the 
high seas. The United States argument was that no state could have the right to 
extend jurisdiction over the high seas,  and furthermore, was concerned with the 
international  precedent it  might set;  fearing that  countries like  Indonesia  (Sunda 
Strait)  and  the  Philippines  might  also  start  asserting  their  sovereignty  over 
international straits. This hardly seems surprising. The new act was innovative in a 
time when environmental concerns were still far from mainstream and was a creative 
way to strengthen the Canadian position in the Arctic  from a defensible position, 
which would not lead the American government to  ‘a plain, flat denial of Canadian 
sovereignty’.30
In relation to AWPPA, in 1977 NORDREG was implemented. This registration 
system of all  ships sailing into Arctic  waters around Canada is strictly  voluntary, 
although 99% of all ships sailing into the Arctic waters thus far have complied with 
it. NORDREG was set up to enhance the safety of ships in arctic waters and the Arctic 
environment they are sailing in. NORDREG issues acknowledgment (not permission!) 
to ships entering Arctic waters, distributes ice and route information and coordinates 
Coast  Guard  icebreaker  assistance.  The  voluntary  nature  of  the  system is  often 
emphasized, partly because the Canadian Coast Guard has very limited icebreaking 
capabilities and cannot be assumed to be able to aid all ships that have run into 
trouble in Arctic waters.31
The next step in the assertion of sovereignty was made in 1985 when the 
Canadian government drew straight baselines around the Canadian archipelago, thus 
claiming  all  waters  in  the  archipelago  as internal  waters. Internal  waters  are  all 
28 D. Pharand, ‘The Arctic Waters and the Northwest Passage: A Final Revisit’ p.11
29 Elliot-Meisel, E. ‘Politics, Pride and Precedent’ p. 211
30 Elliot-Meisel, E. ‘Still Unresolved After Fifty Years’ p. 413-4
31 D. Pharand, ‘The Arctic Waters and the Northwest Passage: A Final Revisit’ p. 49-50
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waters inside the coastline (or straight baseline) of a country, over which a country 
has complete jurisdiction. Territorial waters are waters seaward from the coastline, 
within 12 nautical miles from the coast. The cause for this new Canadian activity on 
the matter was a case almost identical to the Manhattan voyage: again an American 
ship  sailed  into  the  NWP  without  officially  asking  for  Canadian  permission 
beforehand. Again this happened in relatively good cooperation on a governmental 
level, but again it lead to huge public outcry in Canada. 
In 1985, the US Coast Guard icebreaker  Polar Sea sailed through the NWP 
from Greenland to Alaska. The reason given by the US authorities was that using the 
Northwest  Passage  would  save  time  and  fuel  compared  to  sailing  through  the 
Panama Canal. The Canadian public however, never believed this and perceived the 
transit as a provocative threat to Canadian sovereignty.32 Although both the Canadian 
and American governments stated that the transit was made ‘on a cooperative basis 
without prejudicing either state’s legal position’ and Canadian observers were invited 
onboard the US ship, formal consent was never asked by the US government for the 
transit.33 The transit lead to a furious public outcry in Canada over sovereignty in the 
Arctic.
Remarkably, in a 2007 Royal Canadian Mounted Police Criminal Intelligence 
Report on Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic described the Polar Sea voyage as ‘an 
incident where a U.S. icebreaker had sailed through the Northwest Passage without  
Canada’s consent or knowledge’.34 A 1992 United States report also dealing with the 
Northwest Passage dispute states the opposite, giving detailed information on the 
period right before the  Polar Sea voyage: ‘In 1985 several diplomatic notes were  
exchanged regarding an upcoming transit  of  the Northwest Passage by the U.S.  
Coast  Guard  icebreaker  Polar  Sea.  In  May  of  that  year  the  U.S.  informed  the  
Canadian government that due to the operational requirements the Polar Sea would  
be navigating the Northwest passage in August and invited Canadian Coast Guard  
personnel to participate.’35 In the course of the diplomatic  discussion,  the United 
States replied to Canada: “…although the United States is pleased to invite Canadian  
participation in the transit, it has not sought the permission of the Government of  
Canada, nor has it given Canada notification of the fact of transit”36 
32 Elliot-Meisel, E. ‘Still Unresolved After Fifty Years’ p. 415
33 P. J. Briggs, ‘Polar Sea Voyage and the Northwest Passage Dispute’ in: ‘Armed Forces and Society 16’ 
(1990) p. 437
34 RCMP Criminal Intelligence: ‘Canadian Sovereignty in the Arctic: Challenges for the RCMP’ (Ottawa, 
2007) p.4
35 United States Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific 
Affairs: ‘Limits in the Seas: United States Responses to Excessive National Maritime Claims’ 
(Washington D.C., 1992) p.73
36 Ibid. p.74
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What stands out from both these government reports, it that the question of 
notification remains very much unclear. Canada maintains that no notification was 
given, the United States seem to be making a division between ‘notification’ (which 
was not given) and ‘informing’ (which they did). In either case, both governments 
did  communicate  intensively  over  the  matter,  with  Canada  ultimately  giving  its 
unsolicited permission for the transit.37
The extensive public outcry in the Canadian media and press, Inuit concerns 
and the perceived violation of Canadian Arctic sovereignty led to a strong political 
response from the Canadian government: the establishment  of straight  baselines 
around the Arctic archipelago, Arctic cooperation talks with the United States and the 
promise of a stronger naval presence in the Arctic. 
According to international law and jurisprudence, a country may draw straight 
lines along its coast, thereby causing bays, fjords and other coastal indentations to 
be  considered  internal  waters.  Since  1951,  these  baselines  could  –in  specific 
geological circumstances- also be drawn around archipelago areas, making all waters 
between the islands into internal waters. By drawing straight baselines around the 
outer perimeter of the Arctic archipelago in 1985, Canada declared all of the waters 
between its Arctic  islands internal waters. Thus, the complete Northwest Passage 
was now considered internal waters. (See map 2, the red dotted lines indicate the 
straight  baselines,  all  waters inside these lines are considered internal  waters by 
Canada.)  Consequently,  the  baselines  extended  the  Canadian  territorial  waters 
around  the  archipelago  to  12  nautical  miles  seaward  off  the  baselines.  Canada 
characterized  the  waters  between  the  islands  as  ‘internal  waters  of  Canada,  on 
historical basis’38
Both  the  United  States  and  the  European  Community  protested  to  the 
Canadian claim. The United States objected to the claim in general, the EC objected 
to the  way the baselines were drawn, but specifically to the ‘historic’ justification the 
Canadian government gave: “The Member States acknowledge that elements other  
than purely geographical ones may be relevant for purposes of drawing baselines in  
particular circumstances but are not satisfied that the present baselines are justified  
in general. Moreover, the Member States cannot recognize the validity of a historic  
title as justification for the baselines drawn”.39 
According to Pharand, the objections the United States has revolve partly on 
a technical discussion of how straight baselines can look and what can be considered 
an appropriate maximum length (if there is a maximum length) of such lines, since 
37 Department of State, ‘Limits in the Seas’ p.74
38 D. Pharand, ‘The Arctic Waters and the Northwest Passage: A Final Revisit’ p. 11
39 Ibid. p. 11-12
Department of  State, ‘Limits in the Seas’ p.29-30
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the length of some of the baselines in especially the western part of the archipelago 
is relatively long.40
The United States protested stating that:  “The United States cannot accept 
the Canadian claims because to do so would constitute acceptance of full Canadian  
control of the Northwest Passage and would terminate U.S. navigation rights through  
the Passage under international law.”41 
The straight baselines came into effect on January 1st, 1986, as announced 
right  after  the  Polar  Sea  voyage  some  months  earlier.  Canada  emphasizes  the 
unique  nature  of  the  arctic  waters  as  another  justification  for  its  claim.  The 
argument, which is already in use in the 1930s, is that the permanent, slow moving 
ice can be used in the same way as land, and the Inuit have always done so, making 
the normal laws of the seas not applicable to the Arctic.42 As the 1985 Canadian 
Statement on Sovereignty puts it: ‘[The Arctic] Islands are joined, not divided by the  
waters between them. They are bridged for most of  the year by ice. From time  
immemorial Canada’s Inuit people have used the ice as they have used and occupied  
the land.’43 Although a case can certainly be made for the unique qualities of ice-
covered waters, the argument that ice and land are the same and have been used in 
the same way, is not exactly correct. Neither is the United States’ argument that the 
Arctic ocean should be treated as any other ‘liquid’ sea, though: ‘northern people are 
keenly aware of the distinctions between ice and land, and various forms of ice […]  
In this sense, the Canadian tendency to assign the icy passage to the land side of  
the land-water binary is no more accurate (in terms of the passage’s material form,  
its  historic  uses,  or  the  ways  in  which  it  is  perceived  through  everyday  spatial  
practices) than is the American inclination to assign the Passage to the water side.’44 
In fact, the nature of the waters of the Arctic ocean and Northwest Passage is 
much more differentiating than a dichotomy between land and water can define. 
Even in the warmest summers, when navigation through the Passage is possible, the 
term ‘ice-free’ is very optimistic. The waters, even though liquid and navigable, are 
always ice-infested and ships sailing the Passage need special technical adjustments 
to their construction or ice-strengthened hulls to be able to sail the waters safely. 
Icebreaker assistance is often necessary and the risk of stranding in the icepack is 
significant, even the best of conditions.
40 Ibid. p. 23
41 Department of State, ‘Limits in the Seas’ p.29
42 I.L. Head, ‘Canadian Claims’ p.220-221
43 Quoted in: Griffiths, F. ‘The Shipping News –Canada’s Sovereignty not on Thinning Ice’ in: 
‘International Journal 58’ (2003) p.278-9
44 Gerhardt, H. et al. ‘Contested Sovereignty in a Changing Arctic’ in: ‘Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers 100’ (2010) p.995-996
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After  the  Polar  Sea voyage,  talks  between the United  States  and  Canada 
began for an Agreement on Arctic Cooperation to regulate American traffic in waters 
claimed by Canada, while acknowledging the different opinions on the judicial status 
of these waters both countries have. An agreement was met on January 11, 1988. 
This  very  short,  one-page  agreement  focuses  on  the  scientific  and  ecological 
importance of the Arctic and deals only with icebreakers sailing through the Arctic. 
One of its key clauses reads: ‘The Government of the United States pledges that all  
navigation by U.S. icebreakers within waters claimed by Canada to be internal will be  
undertaken with the consent of the Government of Canada.’ However, it is explicitly 
stated  that  ‘Nothing  in  this  agreement  of  cooperative  endeavour  between Arctic  
neighbours and friends nor any practice thereunder affects the respective positions  
of the Governments of the United States and of Canada on the Law of the Sea in this  
or other maritime areas or their respective positions regarding third parties.’ 45
This  Agreement  it  seems,  has  a  very  limited  scope;  only  dealing  with 
icebreakers and not with other vessels, such as submarines. Also, the sovereignty 
question is explicitly left out of the agreement and although both parties have agreed 
that  United  States’  ships  will  only  sail  the  Arctic  waters  with  Canadian  consent, 
nowhere it is noted that this consent has to be asked before the waters are entered. 
In practice however, any surface ship sailing in the Arctic waters will need icebreaker 
assistance, making the Agreement de facto valid for more vessels than defined in it.
President Reagan described the agreement at the time as ‘pragmatic’. Surely, 
this agreement was to a degree the best reachable in a relatively easy way. Although 
the question of sovereignty is once again not addressed, Prime Minister Mulroney’s 
Chief of Staff Burney stated that ‘it sure is implicit recognition’. Whether or not the 
Burney  is  right  remains  to  be  seen,  as  Elliot-Meisel  sums  up:  ‘ultimately,  it 
perpetuated the status quo, that of neighbors continuing to agree to disagree, and  
the agreement lacked closure on the issue.’46
Some (Canadian) scholars have expressed their doubts on the Agreement, 
stressing the fact that the sovereignty question remains open and consent is not 
defined as ‘prior consent’. These issues are described  ‘unfortunate’47 and  ‘obvious 
weaknesses’48 by  some.  The  qualification  of  ‘pragmatic’  President  Reagan  gave 
seems  accurate,  though.  From  1988  to  2000,  three  American  icebreakers  have 
navigated the Northwest Passage,  all  after  Canadian consent  was requested and 
granted in good operational cooperation.49
45 ‘Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America 
on Arctic Cooperation’ (signed Ottawa, January 11, 1988)
46 Elliot-Meisel, E. ‘Still Unresolved After Fifty Years’ p. 418
47 D. Pharand, ‘The Arctic Waters and the Northwest Passage: A Final Revisit’ p. 39
48 Elliot-Meisel, E. ‘Politics, Pride and Precedent’ p. 213
49 D. Pharand, ‘The Arctic Waters and the Northwest Passage: A Final Revisit’ p.40
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A more comprehensive agreement would have been difficult to maintain for 
Canada. Although a stronger Canadian naval presence in the Arctic was promised 
after the Polar Sea transit, this eventually hardly happened. The Canadian navy and 
Coast Guard, despite the Governments ambitions, had (and have) very limited Arctic 
capabilities. In 1987, a Defense policy  ‘White Paper’ was written, announcing huge 
military  investments,  aiming  at  a  ‘three-ocean  navy’,  able  to  assert  and  ensure 
Canadian sovereignty and close the ‘commitment-capabilities gap’. These ambitions 
however, hardly materialized.50 The result is that Canada is either dependent on US 
military presence in the region or, to put it differently, strong cooperation between 
the United States and Canada is required in the Arctic.  In pragmatic  terms, this 
means that sovereignty over the Arctic waters remains difficult to exercise and thus, 
weakens the Canadian claim.
Canada had (and has)  only  two icebreakers with  Arctic  capabilities  and it 
remains difficult for Canada to back up its sovereignty claims, and impossible to even 
detect underwater submarine traffic.51 (More on the security implications of this fact 
can be found in the second chapter of this thesis.) 
The Canadian Navy states that “sovereignty stems from the state’s position  
as  final  authority  over  matters  within  its  territory”52 and  ‘defense  of  Canadian 
interests necessitates a presence that “involves a capability for surveillance, patrol  
and response… [which  are]  the building  blocks of  national  sovereignty”  Although 
Elliot-Meisel notes that sovereignty and cooperation are not mutually exclusive, it 
remains very much notable that Canada relies heavily on its allies (i.e. the United 
States) for the practical side of its Arctic ambitions and concerns. 53 
A smaller  and less complicated territorial  dispute  revolves around the sea 
border between Alaska and Canada in the Beaufort Sea. Here, both countries claim a 
wedge  of  sea  north  of  the  land  border  around  the  141º  meridian.  According  to 
Canada, the sea boundary runs along the same line as the land border, following the 
141º  meridian. This coincides with the western boundary of the pollution prevention 
zone as set out in AWPPA. According to the United States, the sea boundary follows 
the  principle  of  equidistance  from  the  coast,  thereby  making  the  boundary  run 
slightly eastwards from the meridian, but a 90º angle from the coast. Both ways of 
determining  a  border  can be  justified  in  international  law.  Although  the  issue  is 
dormant, it could become relevant in the future because of natural resource potential 
in  the disputed area.54 It  is  described by  one author  as  ‘definitely  an irritant  in 
50 Elliot-Meisel, E. ‘Politics, Pride and Precedent’ p. 213
51 Elliot-Meisel, E. ‘Still Unresolved After Fifty Years’ p.410, 417
52 Ibid. p.419
53 Ibid. p.420
54 Dosman, E.J. ‘Offshore Diplomacy in the Canadian Arctic: The Beaufort Sea and Lancaster Sound’ in: 
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bilateral relations.’55 As with the Northwest Passage dispute however, it is unlikely 
that this dispute would be dealt with other than in a cooperative fashion, even if the 
general public might not always perceive it so.
The  exact  delineation  of  borders  is  important  especially  in  regions  where 
natural resources are present or suspected. Corporations planning to invest in these 
areas will be very reluctant to do so as long as uncertainties on jurisdiction continue 
to exist. As long as it is unclear under which laws and regulations the work would 
take place, whose permits are valid, where taxes are to be paid, etc., operations and 
finance are next to impossible to plan and manage.56
In these issues, the end of the Cold War doesn’t seem to be a strong break in 
continuity: the territorial disputes over the Northwest Passage and the sea border 
with Alaska are still unresolved to this date, although they have become less and 
less problematic, with the gradual birth of region-oriented, international cooperation 
regime focused around the Arctic Council (see the last chapter of this thesis). The 
main  arguments  from the  period  described  in  the  beginning  of  this  chapter  still 
stand.
The fact that the US has not (yet) ratified UNCLOS and Canada only did so in 
2003, is  perceived as problematic by many authors. However, The US has, even 
officially, voiced its support for the Convention on many occasions. Although still not 
ratifying it, it is considered part of international common law by US policy makers. 
This acceptance without ratification seems an unfavorable position for the US to be 
in, since UNCLOS is generally accepted as the legal charter for maritime jurisdiction 
and is explicitly accepted by all Arctic states (including the US) as the relevant legal 
framework.57
The Northwest Passage dispute did become somewhat more lively by the end 
of the 20th century, as it became clear that climatic changes had made the Passage 
navigable for a longer average period each year, though at the same time more 
unpredictable because of melting ice. More recently, realization has struck that the 
NWP will be very challenging to transit for the foreseeable future. The question is 
therefore not very acute or high on the agenda: commercial shipping through the 
passage is  still  a  long way off.  The amount  of literature  reflects  the increase in 
attention. Most literature is, notably, of Canadian origin. The few American authors 
writing  about  the  territorial  issues  with  Canada  in  the  Arctic,  mostly  do  so  in 
government publications. The issues are more of a headache to Canada than to the 
Joyner, C. ‘United States Legislation’ p. 268
55 Riddel-Dixon, E. ‘Canada and Arctic Politics: The Continental Shelf Extension’ in: ‘Ocean Development 
& International Law 39’ p. 347
56 Ibid. 
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United States: Canada has something to lose and a matter of national identity at 
that. For the United States, the Northwest Passage issue seems more of a problem 
as a potential precedent for other straits, and a matter of principles, regarding their 
emphasis on worldwide freedom of navigation. Since the Northwest Passage is still 
far from being a systematically and regularly navigable strait, the discussion does 
seem somewhat academic. Even when it comes to an outburst, such as in 1969 and 
1985 with the  Manhattan and  Polar Sea transits, the aggravation seems to come 
more from the general public than from governments. Also, both transits were hardly 
front-page news in the United States, contrary to the Canadian unrest they caused.
Sovereignty  is  a  recurring  term  in  almost  all  Canadian  government 
publications  pertaining  to  Arctic  matters.  This  gives  an  idea  of  the  continuing 
relevance  of  the  issues  described  here.  Although  some  other  countries  and 
organizations (like the EU) have on occasion spoken out on the NWP, these matters 
are for the main part bilateral. Canada is opposing the US’ opinion, and the fact that 
the matters are still unresolved and Canada continuously feels the need to reassert 
its claims (at least in print) is reflective of the greater power the US has compared to 
Canada. The US cannot however, act or speak out too strongly, lest they affront their 
important neighbor. Canada on the other hand, has no great amount of leverage in 
these matters, as they depend at least partly on US assistance and cooperation in 
managing  (shipping  in)  the  Arctic  waters  due  to  their  insufficient  icebreaker 
capabilities. The legislative actions on the Canadian side show a great amount of 
creativity and pragmatism, as they contribute to a situation nearing sovereignty, in a 
practical  if  not  legal  sense.  The  fact  that  the  US has  adhered  to  the  voluntary 
Canadian regulations and,  even during the controversial  transits  of  the NWP has 
always cooperated with the Canadian government on a practical level, shows their 
freedom of action is not unlimited.
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Chapter 2: Security
While preparing for  the presidential  elections of 1980, Ronald Reagan visited the 
North  American  Air  Defense  (NORAD)  headquarters  in  the  Cheyenne  Mountains, 
Colorado. On that visit, he was impressed by the possibility of tracking missiles in 
flight or even in space. At some point, he asked what could be done in the event of a 
nuclear attack on the US. The answer astonished him: the military could do nothing 
but  sent  out  a  warning  that  the  destruction  of  the  American  continent  was 
imminent.58 Some  three  years  later,  in  1983,  Reagan  proposed  a  new  security 
program for the US, called the Strategic Defense Initiative, often dubbed 'Star Wars' 
because  of  its  science  fiction-style  innovation  plans.  The  program was aimed at 
protecting the US from missile strike, rather than retaliation after one had happened. 
The ambitious program had hardly come underway when the geostrategic world was 
turned upside down with the end of the Cold War in 1989.
As the US' only northern neighbor, and literally wedged in between the Soviet 
mainland and the US, Canada was of high importance to the US during the Cold War. 
The relationship was and is, mainly one of intense cooperation, though several issues 
existed between the two countries concerning security, during the Cold War, but also 
after it had ended. The Arctic was, out of geostrategic necessity, a key area. After 
all,  for  the  USSR  to  reach  the  American  continent,  missiles,  aircraft,  ships  or 
submarines had to pass over (or under) the Arctic, through Canadian territory.
The North American Air Defense Agreement was established in 1958 between 
the United States and Canada, mainly to protect North America from the threat of 
Soviet bombers. Before that, defense cooperation between the two countries already 
existed in the Permanent Joint Board of Defense, established in 1940. The PJBD ran 
three Canadian-based radar systems. The Pinetree Line along the 50th parallel, the 
Mid-Canada Line or McGill Fence, and the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, running 
through the Alaskan and Canadian Arctic roughly along the 69th parallel, which was 
finished after less than two years of construction in 1957. Of the three, only the 
Distant Early  Warning Line became important  in  Cold War defense. Although the 
construction (and to some degree, operation) of radar systems on Canadian soil gave 
Canadians some concerns over their sovereignty in the Arctic, Americans formally 
acknowledged  Canadian  sovereignty  over  the  Arctic  lands  in  return  for  the 
development of the radar system.59 
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The 1950's radar lines were designed to give warning for  Soviet bombers 
entering North American airspace. However, by the end of the 1950, Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missiles (ICBM's, Cruise Missiles) had been developed in the Soviet Union, 
for which hardly any defense was possible. These missiles could be fired from large 
distances, in later decades also from aircraft (Air-Launched Ballistic Missiles, ALBM's) 
and from submarines (SLBM's), were smaller than a manned aircraft, could travel 
long distances and could be armed with nuclear warheads.60 Defense against these 
missiles would remain the most important security concern of both the United States 
and Canada during the Cold War and, to some extent, after 1989 as well.
NORAD was established as a common defense of the airspace. Both Canada 
and  the  US  were  active  members  of  NATO,  but  it  was  felt  that,  because  of 
geographic  circumstances,  a  joint  air  command  was  necessary.  For  Canada, 
sovereignty  was  an  ever-present  concern  in  relations  and  cooperation  with  the 
United States. 'How could Ottawa consider itself to be the equal of Washington in the  
joint defense of the continent? What influence could Canada hope to excercise? This  
feeling of threatened independence was exacerbated by the relative high level of US  
military activity in Canada during these years.'61 The US for its part, depended on 
Canadian cooperation in continental defense, fearing attack from the north. The US 
could not afford an undefended Arctic.
Canada was now very close to being actively involved in nuclear strategy, 
although  Canada never  had any nuclear  weapons themselves,  nor  any American 
nuclear  weapons  on  its  territory,  because  of  its  active  disarmament  and  non-
proliferation  stance.62 The  advantages  of  NORAD,  however,  outnumbered  the 
concerns. Canada was able to have a say in continental defense to a degree they 
would never have had if the defense were the responsibility of the US alone. They 
also  had  access  to  a  comprehensive  defense  system  covering  their  complete 
territory, on a scale and level of technology they could never have reached alone. 
Also,  the  Canadians  were,  because of  NORAD,  privy  to  defense  intelligence  that 
otherwise the US would never have shared with a 'normal' NATO ally. Although the 
Commander in Chief of NORAD (CINCNORAD) was agreed to be an American, his 
Deputy  (DCINCNORAD)  was  Canadian,  and  several  Canadian  officers  would  hold 
positions within in the command. Both Commanders in Chief are responsible to both 
the  US  and  Canadian  Governments.  Reflecting  population  and  economy  sizes, 
Canada finances about 10% of NORAD, while the US takes on the other 90% which, 
for Canada, is cheaper than a national air defense system would be, even at a lower 
60 Purver, R. 'Arctic Arms Control: Constraints and Opportunities' (Ottawa, 1988) p. 4
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level of sophistication and coverage.63 Also, Canadian companies benefit from the so-
called Defense Production Sharing Agreement, allowing them to compete on an equal 
footing with American companies on the American defense market, representing an 
economic advantage as well.64 NORAD is a bi-national (not bilateral) agreement, with 
the command being joined, not national. However, this has at some points meant 
that  (Canadian)  officers  in  NORAD  were  better  informed  than  their   domestic 
superiors.  For  example,  when  Canadian  Prime  Minister  Diefenbaker  signed  the 
agreement in 1958 (after it had been implemented), he was not informed that the 
threat of  Soviet bombers, one of the early justifications for the establishment of 
NORAD, had largely made way for ICBM's, for which no defense was possible at that 
time. Also, the influence Canada has over NORAD is limited mainly to operational 
contributions, according to some authors. It does not reach to the basic strategic 
imperatives and objectives of NORAD, so they argue.65
With concerns over sovereignty in mind, the Trudeau government set about 
to 'Canadianize' all continental defense activities taking place in Canada. In the 1975 
NORAD  renewal,  the  NORAD  regional  and  operational  control  centers  were 
reorganized, now conforming to the Canada-US border, where before these were 
mainly based in the United States. Control over the north American airspace was 
now carried out according to the territorial  boundaries.  This  focus on continental 
defense in Canada meant a decrease in NATO involvement, something which had 
Washington concerned.66
In 1968, the so-called ABM-clause was added to the NORAD agreement, on 
the specific request of Canada.67 ABM stands for Anti Ballistic Missiles. This type of 
defense has been controversial form the start. Defense against ballistic missiles was 
difficult, if not impossible in the first post-war decades. Later, when some form of 
defense from these missiles  became possible,  it  meant  that  for  a defense to be 
effective, a huge active ABM-arsenal had to be installed, hardly in line with arms 
reduction or non-proliferation objectives. For an effective defense against a limited 
number of cruise missiles, many more ABM weapons had to be installed, because 
defense against these weapons is more difficult than attacking with them. According 
to many critics,  this  would not only start  a new arms race, but would be highly 
destabilizing, because due to the weapons build-up, one side could be tempted to 
strike  first,  undermining  the  stability  born  out  of  Mutually  Assured  Destruction 
(MAD). MAD was the name for the situation in which both superpowers knew and 
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acknowledged  that  both  they  and  their  opponent  had  the  nuclear  capability  to 
destroy the other in retaliation to a nuclear attack. This was considered effective 
deterrence from using nuclear  attack  and formed the basis  of  Cold  War defense 
against nuclear arms.68 
The ABM-clause was removed from the NORAD-agreement in 1981, when it 
was felt to be unnecessary, because the US and USSR had signed an ABM treaty in 
1972, limiting both superpowers'  numbers of ABM-installations to one.  The ABM-
clause in NORAD was more or less symbolical.  'The secretary of state for external  
affairs has explained that the clause was deleted because it was felt that the ABM 
treaty was holding. Thus the government wanted to avoid any suggestion that either  
Canada or the United States would take any action contrary to the Treaty. Another  
reason was that since the US had not maintained the one system permitted under  
the Treaty, there was even less need for the clause.' 69
In  1981,  the  name  of  the  agreement  was  changed  to  North  American 
Aerospace Defense Agreement, reflecting the changes in possibilities from mere air-
defense to include (projected) space defense. Two years later, on March 23, 1983, 
President Reagan announced a radical  change in American defense: the Strategic 
Defense Initiative.  In his televised speech,  Reagan did not mention the Initiative 
itself,  but announced, with plenty of rhetoric drama  'a vision of the future which 
offers  hope'.  This  vision  would  entail  strategic  defense  against  soviet  ICBM's: 
'counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive (...) we  
could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own  
soil  or  that  of  our  allies'.70 In  this  speech,  Reagan  announced  a  research  and 
development project aimed at active defense against ballistic missiles. The program 
was quickly dubbed 'Star Wars', because of the importance of space and computer 
technologies and its science-fiction like aspects. 
Although  Reagan  stated  that  the  Initiative  would  be  'consistent  with  our 
obligations  under  the  ABM  treaty'71,  the  program  was  cause  for  worry  on  the 
Canadian  side.  Since  NORAD was  renamed  to  include  Aerospace defense,  many 
feared Canada would now be involved in active BMD, something they explicitly did 
not want. A joint House of Commons and Senate Committee looking into Foreign 
Policy, also set out to assess Canadian public and political opinion on this topic. A 
clear answer was never formulated. The official government response to SDI was 
somewhat ambivalent in the end: 'the government had decided not to participate in  
68 Ibid.
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SDI on a “government-to-government” basis because “Canada's own policies and  
priorities” did not warrant it. However, private companies and institutions would be  
free to compete for SDI business and research contracts. On the question of SDI  
itself, the minister said that Canada regarded it as “both consistent with the ABM  
Treaty  and  prudent  in  the  light  of  significant  advances  in  Soviet  research  and  
deployment of the world's only existing ballistic missile defense system”.72 
Despite  reassurances  that  Canada  would  not  be  involved  in  SDI  on  a 
governmental  level,  the  linkage  between  SDI  and  NORAD  remained  worrisome, 
especially when in 1985 the US Space Command (USSPACECOM) was established, 
whose commander in chief (CINCSPACE) would also be commander of USAF Space 
Command  and,  most  notably,  Commander  in  Chief  of  NORAD.  Although  the 
integration of Space Command and NORAD had been underway for some time, this 
gave  rise  to  additional  worries  that  CINCSPACE  would  be  given  operational 
responsibilities for Anti Satellite and Ballistic Missile Defenses, once those systems 
would be operational. Although the NORAD terms of reference still excluded these 
operations, many feared the command structure made NORAD perhaps too much 
intertwined with these more aggressive forms of defense.73 
SDI was expected to cost more than $40 billion.74 Although Canada did not 
actively participate in SDI, the Canadian government mentioned multiple times that 
the program was in line with the ABM Treaty and did not oppose it in any way. The 
Canadian military forces meanwhile, had been subject to years of budgets cuts and a 
decrease in importance over the years the liberal Pierre Elliot Trudeau was Prime 
Minister (1968-1979, 1980-1984). This had lead to a situation in which the military 
was underfunded, lacked equipment and personnel and its required maintenance and 
training. NATO had not been a priority under the Trudeau government, something 
which not only troubled some European allies, but was not viewed positively in the 
US either.75 A defense review was set up under the new Progressive Conservative 
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, which lead to an ambitious Defense White Paper in 
1987. The conclusions on the current state of the Canadian Forces were clear: 'we 
are  not  able  to  meet  [our]  commitments  fully  and  effectively.  After  decades  of  
neglect, there is indeed a “commitment-capability gap”. (...) much of the equipment  
of most elements of the Canadian Forces is in an advanced state of obsolescence or  
is already obsolete. Modernization programs have not kept pace with obsolescence.  
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(...) The root of the problem is the level of funding available to defense over the last  
25 year.'76 
The  1987  Defense  Policy  stands  out  among  other  White  Papers  of  the 
surrounding decades. Not only is it by far the largest with almost 90 pages, it is 
clearly also the most ambitious policy paper of the lot. Filled with pictures of 'the 
men and women in uniform', the paper is  fairly  bristling with Cold War rhetoric, 
mentioning the possibility of Soviet attack multiple times and constantly mentioning 
the  strong  bond  with  the  United  States  on  defense  matters  (and  NATO  to  a 
somewhat  lesser  extent).  Also  a  very  remarkable  feature  is  the  continuing 
mentioning of Canadian sovereignty in the paper. This is a great concern for the 
Department  of  National  Defense  and  although  national  sovereignty  may  seem 
obvious or self-evident near the end of the twentieth century, this is clearly not so 
for Canada, given the continuing differences over the Canadian-Alaskan sea border 
and the Northwest Passage.
The  defense  review and  the  resulting  White  Paper  fit  in  rather  well  with 
Mulroney’s efforts at improving relations with the US. Before taking office, Mulroney 
declared  that  ‘good,  super  relations  with  the  US will  be  the  cornerstone  of  our  
foreign policy’. Riding the tide of worldwide neo-liberalism, Mulroney’s Tory policies 
fitted  well  with  the  Reagan  Administration’s  course.  According  to  some authors, 
Canadian policy was ‘adapted’ to US policy in this time.77
A shared ambition of both the US and Canada was the replacement of the old 
Distant Early Warning radar line with the so-called North Warning System (NWS). 
This new radar system, build to warn of any (Soviet) activity in the Arctic towards 
the American continent, would consist of 13 long range radars, 11 of which would be 
stationed in the Canadian Arctic. A further 39 unmanned short range radars would be 
installed, of which 36 on Canadian soil. The system was specifically designed to warn 
for low-flying (and thus difficult to trace) bombers and cruise missiles. The system 
would  be  complemented  with  “Over  the  Horizon  Backscatter”  (OTH-B)  radars, 
located in the United States. These radars combined would cover the north American 
airspace completely. The project would cost about $7 billion, some 88% of which 
would be paid  by the US,  leaving 12% of the costs  to Canada and thus almost 
following the usual  1:10 ratio,  even though the majority  of  the radars would be 
located in Canada.78
One important notion in the 1987 Policy is the lack of Arctic capabilities of the 
Canadian Forces. The Department of Defense wanted a 'three ocean navy', capable 
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of operating in all three of the oceans surrounding Canada: the Atlantic, Pacific and 
Arctic oceans (roughly in that order). Although the Atlantic was considered the most 
important of the three, followed by the (northeast) Pacific, the importance of the 
Arctic  is  also stressed in the Policy Paper:  'Over the past  two decades, with the 
development  of  nuclear  power,  the  Arctic  has  become  an  operating  area  for  
submarines. (...)  In a period of tension or war, Soviet submarines could seek to  
operate  off  the  deep  channels  of  the  Canadian  Archipelago  to  intercept  Allied  
submarines entering the Arctic. Moreover, the Soviets might use these channels in  
war to reach patrol areas in the North Atlantic, including the Labrador Sea. In light of  
these  circumstances,  the  Canadian  navy  must  be  able  to  determine  what  is  
happening under the ice in the Canadian Arctic, and to deter hostile or potentially  
hostile intrusions. At present, the Canadian Navy cannot carry out in the Arctic these  
roles  essential  to  our  security  and  sovereignty.'79 To  address  this  lack  of  Arctic 
capabilities,  the government  planned on acquiring ten to  twelve nuclear-powered 
submarines, capable of under ice operations, to be stationed in ports on all three 
oceans.80 Several other proposals for new materiel are made in the Policy Paper, all 
with the goal of getting the army up to the task of countering the perceived Soviet 
threat  and  'providing  a  more  credible  and  sustainable  contribution  to  collective  
security'81 (i.e. be more active in NATO).
According to some scholars, however, the Canadian Forces did not need the 
investments  just  for  the  protection  against  the  Soviets,  but  also  for  protection 
against the US. As a smaller country intimately allied with the US, Canada, so fear 
many Canadian scholars, is always at the risk of losing the freedom to pursue its 
own (foreign) policy agenda and objectives, and being subject to 'unwanted help' in 
mainly defense from their larger neighbor. This idea is called 'defense against help' 
and  has  lead  many  Canadians  to  believe  that  the  US  can  constitute  a  risk  to 
Canadian sovereignty if Canada does not have adequate national defense abilities, 
and therefore, defense should be a priority for Canada. 'In Canada, defense against  
help  is  a  policy  response  to  that  nation's  somewhat  unconventional  “security  
dilemma,”  the  essence  of  which  is  that  the  United  States,  in  the  process  of  
guaranteeing Canada's safety, could itself become a security threat.''82 This security 
threat  would  consist  of  the  US gaining  too  much  influence  in  Canadian  security 
policy,  tipping the balance between interdependence and sovereignty by reducing 
Canadian freedom to act. 
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Ever since the end of the Second World War, cooperation between the US and 
Canada has lead to  a certain  level  of  integration  or adjustment  of  the Canadian 
Forces to US military practice, or, as one author puts it: 'By 1948 the PJBD had 
become  a  justification  for  converting  Canada's  armed  services  to  American  
equipment, doctrine, training, and, ultimately, values.'83 
According  to  some  authors,  the  attention  given  to  the  commitment-
capabilities gap was not just to deter the Soviet Union, nor to reassure NATO that 
the Mulroney government was giving higher priority to the Alliance than Trudeau's 
had. According to some, the renewed attention for defense was mainly to deter the 
US from providing any unwanted help in the defense of Canada.  'Although it was 
couched in Cold War term and was intended “to demonstrate Canada's utility as a  
loyal American ally,”  (…) it  was also designed to defend Canada from unsolicited  
American help. This could be seen in the Government' decision to increase the size  
of  the  armed forces,  and to  upgrade  Canadian  coastal  defenses,  anti-submarine  
warfare capabilities, and air defenses.'84 
One  author  states  that  the  US  was  not  happy  with  the  new  Canadian 
ambitions:  'Washington was not pleased with another Canadian initiative: a dozen  
nuclear-powered submarines could operate in all three of Canada's oceans. By 1989,  
Canadian  critics  had  loyally  sunk  the  project;  henceforth,  American  submarines  
would tell  Canadians whatever the Pentagon thought they needed to know about  
activities in the Polar icecap.'85 According to this view, Washington wanted Canada to 
increase its defense expenses, but only on Washington’s terms, following American, 
not Canadian priorities.
Despite all military ambitions on either side of the 49th parallel, both the US 
and Canada saw huge defense cuts, rather than investments, by the end of the 80's 
and the following decade. At first due to economic downturn, and later, because of a 
lessening  of  Cold  War  tensions  and  the  eventual  end  of  the  Cold  War.  Mikhail 
Gorbachev's  perestrojka and  glasnost first  reduced  the  Soviet  threat,  then  it 
vanished  with  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  Warsaw  Pact  after  1989. 
Gorbachev had called for a lessening of military tension in the Arctic in his 1987 
Murmansk speech.  This speech is seen as the advent of a new security narrative, 
centering around ‘human security’  rather  than military  or  strategic  security.  This 
means including things like environmental concerns, energy security and a strong 
focus on human rights and well-being into security policies. This concept included 
environmental protection as crucial to the safety of food, water, air and living area.86 
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With the end of the Cold War, cooperation between the former adversaries became 
possible. At the same time, globalization became truly possible, since no longer was 
a  significant  part  of  the  world  off-boundary  for  governmental  and  commercial 
cooperation.
The  results  of  Gorbachev's  policies  can  be  seen  in  early  1989,  with  the 
Canadian Defense Update for 1988-89, the first (and last!) annual update on the 
1987 Policy Paper. The tone of this document is much more hopeful than that of the 
former. But, though the Soviet threat is acknowledged to have decreased, the plans 
as  laid  out  are  still  to  be  continued.  The  acquisition  of  10-12  nuclear-powered 
submarines by 1996 is repeated and an update of the progress on the NWS is given, 
which is by then nearing completion.87 
Three years later, however, when the next White Paper on Canadian Defense 
Policy is published, the level of ambition has been greatly reduced already, given the 
changes in the geopolitical  and geostrategic  world.  The new security  narrative is 
reflected in an emphasis on global peace and security, with an important role for the 
United Nations. The recurrent theme of defense against help can also be seen again: 
'In  the  North  American  context,  only  the  United  States  has  the  full  arsenal  of  
weapons  necessary  to  defend  a  continent  as  vast,  as  diversified  and  as  thinly  
populated as ours. At the same time, the United States relies upon us to undertake a  
reasonable effort in our own defense. If we were to fail to do so, we could expect  
demands  form  the  United  States  with  regard  to  its  own  northern  security  
requirements. These could well be incompatible with full Canadian independence and  
sovereignty. In short, some degree of defense effort is required if we are to remain  
an  independent  nation.'88 Defense  against  help  is  clearly  an  important  point  for 
Canadian defense policy makers.
The reason why this  is  an even bigger point  in the 1992 White Paper,  is 
because large budget cuts in defense are being presented. Canada retreats all its 
forces from Europe (which  are  presumed not to be necessary anymore with the 
Warsaw Pact no longer in place), personnel numbers are being cut drastically, as are 
equipment and infrastructure expenses: 'A greatly altered geostrategic situation and 
the  consequent  increase  in  threat  warning  time  means  that  we  can  reduce  the  
readiness of certain elements of the Canadian Forces without jeopardizing Canadian  
security.'89 The cuts were dramatic: by 1999, defense spending had been cut by 25% 
and reduced the armed forces by 30% of the amounts of ten years before.90
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Although the objectives of the Department of National Defense related to the 
Arctic do not change, the planned investments do differ quite a bit from the former 
policy  papers.  Where  the  diesel-powered  Oberon-class  submarines  were  called 
'obsolete and insufficient to perform today's tasks'91, the 1992 White Paper states 
that  'Despite their many years of service, these boats are equipped with modern  
combat  control  equipment  and  weapons.'92 In  1994 the  option was  'explored'  to 
acquire from the British navy four Upholder class (later named Victoria class) Diesel-
electric  submarines  instead.  Bought  in  1998,  they  were  taken  into  service  from 
2000-2003. While this is a significant modernization and these ships do have Arctic 
capabilities, these ships are a clear down scaling from the original 10-12 nuclear-
powered submarines proposed in 1987.93 Notice is given to the acquisition of some 
aircraft with arctic capabilities and the full implementation of the NWS, but given the 
fact that the former is far less expensive than ships with Arctic capabilities and the 
latter was almost finished in 1989 already, the Arctic ambitions are clearly tuned 
down significantly.
The fact that the Cold War had ended, did not make the world a safer place. 
In fact, before 1989, it was at least clear were the threat came from. After the end of 
the Cold War, a more unstable world emerges, with wars erupting in unexpected 
places  and  'rogue  states',  such  as  North-Korea  becoming  a  new  threat.  The 
possibility of these states harboring ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD)  or  terrorists  emerges.  The  United  States  kept  playing  an  active  role  in 
international peacekeeping, and so did Canada. 
Canada  however,  only  took  action  in  UN-sanctioned  missions  and  stayed 
clearly within the UN framework. This might have been yet another example of the 
defense against help doctrine; Canada actively asserting its military capabilities to 
ensure  to  the  US  it  was  still  a  reliable  NATO,  NORAD  (and  UN)  military  ally. 
According  to  one  author  'in  the  post-Cold  War  era,  the  Canadian  government 
continued, and continues, to attempt to temper America's security-driven agenda  
regarding continental defense by reassuring Washington that it is concerned about  
security  imperatives,  in  order  to  reduce  the  likelihood  and  potential  impact  of  
American unilateral gestures.'94 
Canada does play an active military role, but has changed its perception of 
security more radically away from strategic security and towards the broader concept 
of  human  security.  Washington  seemed  less  than  pleased  with  their  neighbor's 
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military  budget  cuts,  but  since  Canada  was living  up to  its  military  promises  in 
conflict areas, real pressure could not be mounted.
With the new threats taking place more and more on other, more localized 
places  of  the  world,  the  relevance  of  the  Arctic  from  a  defense  perspective 
decreased. True, the transfer of the Soviet nuclear missile  arsenal to Russia had 
many, both in Ottawa and Washington, worried, but a threat from ‘up north’ had 
become  highly  unlikely.  This  is  reflected  in  the  down  scaling  of  equipment 
acquisitions  and  the  heightened  attention  given  to  new threats,  including  rogue 
states, cyber attacks, drugs trafficking and other non-military threats. These would 
probably not come via the Arctic. The importance of the high north shifted towards 
the economic and ecological, and away from the strategic.
The US-Canadian defense relationship during the whole second half  of the 
twentieth century, and explicitly in the last two decades of it, strongly reflect the icy 
grip thesis and clearly shows the balance between interdependence and sovereignty. 
The Arctic was a region of major importance for both countries, as it lies directly 
between the north American continent and the Soviet Union. The US cannot afford 
an  undefended  northern  boundary  of  the  continent,  but  Canada  cannot  afford 
(literally) the defense infrastructure necessary to defend and monitor their northern 
territories. In short: both countries need each other. And although the US seems to 
determine the overall direction of the continental defense, Canada does have its own 
opinion, for example on ABM and is capable of making itself heard. Canada managed 
to stay out of ABM for the most part and the Canadian government stayed out of 
SDI. This was not easy, however. 
Economic downturn and the end of the Cold War meant a decrease in military 
expenditure in both countries. After the Cold War, however, Canada could renew its 
ambition  of  being  a  leading  nation  in  international  mediation  and  peacekeeping, 
through active UN-participation. In this role, Canada is somewhat more free from US 
dominance. New threats, however, also mean new defenses, and cooperation is still 
very much necessary, leaving both countries intimately connected.
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Chapter 3: Energy
The US as the determinant factor and Canada mostly in a responsive position is the 
basic  situation  in  many  US-Canadian  interactions.  This  situation  seems  quite 
different in the field of energy. With oil (and to a lesser extent natural gas) as the 
motor of the world economy for the past century and the foreseeable future, Canada, 
as a net exporter and major producer of fossil fuels has some clear bargaining power 
over  its  main  importer,  the  US.  However,  this  also  means  that  the  Canadian 
economy is highly dependent on US oil imports, making the relationship once again 
one of mutual interdependence.95 Energy security has for a long time been a concern 
of especially the US, but with the post-Cold War security concept including energy 
security  more  prominently,  this  facet  of  energy  policy  has  come  more  to  the 
foreground.  Meanwhile,  that  new  security  concept  also  gives  higher  priority  to 
environmental concerns, which are an important factor in especially Arctic energy 
production and transport.
The United States are a net importer of oil, importing more than half of their 
required oil in 2003, as oil demand is about twice as high as domestic production. 96 
Oil is imported mainly from Canada, which is perceived as a solid, safe partner to 
import  the  economically  vital  commodity  from.97 Although  the  US  produces 
substantial  amounts of oil  and natural  gas on its  own, domestic  demand greatly 
exceeds supply for energy. Canada on the other hand, has oil reserves about eight 
times larger than those of its southern neighbor (although not all of these are readily 
available,  as  we  shall  see)  and  domestic  supply  exceeding  demand.  Although 
Canadian natural gas reserves are about a third of those in the US, domestic demand 
in the US exceeds supply in the gas sector as well.98 Canada does import some of its 
oil,  though,  since  oil  production  almost  exclusively  takes  place  in  the  western 
provinces  and  then  mainly  in  Alberta.  The  Atlantic  provinces  are  predominantly 
serviced by imported oil. The Arctic contains substantial amounts of hydrocarbons: 
mainly natural gas, but oil as well. Exploitation of Arctic oil and gas reserves is more 
technologically challenging than in moderate climates. 
The 1970’s witnessed several major oil crises, with OPEC-countries showing 
their muscles and their power over the world economy because they controlled oil 
supply to basically everywhere on the globe. The apparent volatility of oil supply and 
the sudden skyrocketing of energy prices made many developed countries anxious. 
In Canada,  the Liberal  Trudeau government embarked on a controversial  federal 
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energy policy in 1981, called ‘National Energy Program’ (NEP). This sparked a myriad 
of conflicts and discontent, both domestic and with the United States.
The NEP had three main goals: first, to provide for energy security in Canada 
through  greater  self-sufficiency  in  (mainly)  oil  and  decrease  dependence  on  the 
world market; secondly, ‘fairness’ in pricing and revenue sharing, which meant a 
lower consumer price for domestically produced oil than foreign oil and a larger share 
of  domestic  oil  revenues  to  flow  to  the  federal  government;  thirdly,  increase 
Canadian participation in and ownership of the energy sector, which was at that time 
mainly  foreign-owned.99 A  fourth  goal  was  the  promotion  of  exploration  and 
exploitation of ‘new’ hydrocarbon sources, mainly the Albertan oil sands and Arctic oil 
and gas fields, which would mean higher domestic production and thus improve self-
sufficiency.
Although a 1976 Economic Council  of Canada Report advised against a ‘2-
price’ policy, calling it ‘too blunt and course an instrument’100, exactly such a policy 
was developed in NEP. Domestic wellhead prices of conventionally produced oil (‘old’ 
oil) would not be allowed to exceed 75% of world prices. Newly discovered oil and oil 
from unconventional sources (for example, the Albertan Tar Sands or Arctic oil) could 
be priced at a maximum of 100% of world prices.101 Exports of oil would be subject 
to approval of the National Energy Board (NEB), and permitted only if there was an 
exportable surplus.102 
In 1970, more than 90% of all oil and natural gas related industry in Canada 
was foreign owned. Twenty years later, the majority of these activities are controlled 
by Canadians.103 Although opinions of authors differ whether that was more or less 
caused  by  NEP  or  that  NEP  was  merely  an  episode  in  the  ongoing  process  of 
‘Canadianization’, fact is that the Canadian oil and gas industry changed from mainly 
foreign companies and interests to an industry profoundly Canadian. By the time NEP 
was introduced, the oil industry was still more than 70% foreign-owned. One of the 
goals of NEP was a 50% Canadian ownership of the oil industry by 1990. To promote 
Canadian  ownership  and  the  development  of  unconventional  oil  sources  such  as 
those  in  the  Arctic,  an  incentive  program  was  developed  for  exploration  and 
development projects: the Petroleum Incentive Program (PIP). Grants were awarded 
based on the percentage Canadian ownership of a company: for companies more 
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than  75%  Canadian-owned,  PIP  grants  provided  35%  costs  for  exploration  on 
provincial lands and as much as 80% on the so-called ‘Canada lands’, federal-owned 
lands, such as the (semi-)Arctic Yukon and Northwest territories, offshore areas and 
the Canadian Arctic. Companies that were 50-75% Canadian owned could have 10% 
of  costs  provided  for  by  PIP  on  provincial  lands  and  45%  on  Canada  lands. 
Companies less than 50% Canadian were not eligible for PIP on provincial lands, but 
could receive grants for 25% of exploration costs on Canada lands. Production on 
Canada  lands  could  only  be  carried  out  by  companies  at  least  50%  Canadian 
owned.104 
The state-owned oil company Petro-Canada (established already in 1975) was 
also used as a tool to increase domestic ownership of the industry. A particularly 
controversial part of NEP was the so-called ‘back-in’ clause, reserving a 25% interest 
rate for Petro-Canada in all existing and future oil and gas discoveries (which could 
be  converted  into  a  working  interest)  on  Canada  lands.  This  would  give  the 
government more influence in future oil exploration projects in the Arctic and other 
federal lands. This clause was one of the first parts of NEP to be changed, with the 
federal government offering to pay some of the exploration costs of the projects it 
was backing into, to be paid for by the money they would receive once production 
began.105 
Since a large part of foreign companies active in the Canadian oil sector were 
from  the  US,  the  reaction  from  Washington  was  furious.  The  canadianization 
measures  were  called  ‘unfair,  discriminatory,  and  worse’, mainly  because  ‘US 
companies  are  by  far  the  dominant  foreign  entities  in  the  Canadian  petroleum 
industry, the impact of the NEP has fallen heavily upon US corporate interests.(…)  
NEP appeared to be linked to a number of unfriendly takeover attempts by Canadian  
firms directed at  US parent  companies’.106 US companies  feared that  mainly  the 
‘middle tier’ of the oil industry would be threatened by NEP. Mostly however, the US 
government was very worried about the discriminatory measures featured in NEP. 
According to the US, the structure of PIP, amongst others, was not in line with the 
principles of ‘national treatment’ of foreign investment as laid down in GATT and the 
foreign  investment  regime  of  the  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and 
Development (OECD). The US response was fierce in part because the US feared that 
other  countries  would  follow  Canada’s  example  in  nationalist  and  protectionist 
policies:  ‘The  US  government  response  has  potentially  considerable  precedential  
significance vis-à-vis other countries which might seek to emulate Canada (...) The  
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US regards this situation as undesirable not only in itself, but particularly in terms of  
the encouragement it might give to less developed countries (LDCs).’107
One of the key points the Reagan administration objected to was the new, 
more active role of the Canadian Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA). Set up 
in 1974, its  goal  was to assess whether a foreign investment in  Canada,  in  any 
sector, was beneficial to the Canadian economy. In the period 1974-1980, FIRA had 
usually refused some 7% of applications for investment or acquisition. In 1980, this 
percentage rose to 13%, in addition to a far more rigorous review process, which 
increased  process  time  and  created  a  considerable  backlog  in  cases.  Although 
officially  separate,  the  US government  saw the  new FIRA policy  as  part  of  NEP 
(although FIRA oversaw all economic sectors, not only the energy sector). ‘Although 
the U.S. government had taken a rather tolerant view in the past,  it viewed the  
combined impact of the NEP and the “new” FIRA as excessively nationalist.’  108 A 
GATT-panel review was requested for by the US, which eventually lead to approval of 
FIRA’s policies, but it was a clear sign for Ottawa that the US was not content with 
Canada’s nationalist policies. 
The  Canadian  reaction  was  partly  defensive,  but  mostly  very  pragmatic. 
Canada never failed to point out that much of the American objections were fuelled 
by US corporate interests –especially when Congress got actively involved for a short 
period.109 Congressional calls for retaliatory measures were not taken very seriously 
by the Administration, since these would severely frustrate the bilateral relationship. 
In an especially polemic set of articles, a Canadian M.P. not only noted the rash 
proposals of  ‘certain US Congressmen’, but also mentioned the role of US media: 
‘much of the US media  had its  own reasons (some of them related to  previous  
brushes  with  Canadian regulation  on foreign magazines and cable  television)  for  
searching  out  further  ‘lapses’  in  Canadian  treatment  of  foreign  enterprises.’110 
According  to  this  M.P.,  part  of  the  problems  stemmed  from  ‘mistiming  or 
misperceptions superimposed on serious and deep differences in policy approaches  
by the two governments’.111 Although communications may have been smoother had 
‘timing’ and ‘perception’ been more advantageous, the ‘serious and deep differences 
in  policy  approaches’ were  so  profound  that  blaming  circumstances,  rash 
Congressmen or corporate lobbying does not seem sufficient.
Although NEP never called for nationalization of oil companies, this was often 
misperceived  in  the  US.  Canadianization  meant  promoting  ownership  of  firms 
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operating in Canada by Canadians, not the Canadian government. One other heavily 
criticized point,  the ‘back-in’ clause, was said to affect Canadian firms as well  as 
foreign ones, therefore not being especially disadvantageous to US companies. The 
most problematic  point  however,  that  of  discriminatory  measures against  foreign 
companies,  was  reacted  upon  strictly  defensively  by  the  Canadian  government: 
‘Generous grants are paid to foreign companies to help them with their exploration  
costs on federal lands and offshore; we are simply giving even more generous grants  
to Canadian-owned firms.’ 112 Clearly, Ottawa had set out a course and was not at all 
willing to change it.
However, the firm political stance notwithstanding, the practical outcome of 
the policies was far more pragmatic. The new ownership rules of PIP sparked a wave 
of  joint-ventures  between  Canadian  and  US  firms  being  set  up,  dramatically 
increasing  the  percentage  of  Canadian  ownership  in  the  energy  sector,  but 
maintaining  a  significant  level  of  US  influence  in  it.  Moreover,  the  Canadian 
government was willing to make many and far-reaching exceptions and concessions 
to energy projects, such as tax-holidays, exceptions to price policy, etc. This lead to 
one company  executive’s  analysis  that  the  government  ‘made  a  whole  series  of  
exceptions, so that the exception is now the rule’.113
In the end, the program did succeed insofar as that Canadian ownership was 
increased (although this may have been part of an ongoing trend114) and federal 
income  from  oil  and  gas  exploration  increased.  However,  it  was  not  Canadian 
consumers who paid  the price  for  higher  taxes,  because  of  the stringent  pricing 
policies, nor were the foreign (or national) oil companies the ones who footed the 
bill. They were able to set up lucrative joint ventures, lobby for significant exceptions 
and overall found ways to work around the rules and regulations to their advantage. 
The party who eventually turned out to be paying for the increase in federal income 
and influence were the governments of the producing provinces: mainly Alberta.115
The NEP did not last very long. It was designed in a time of extremely high oil 
and gas prices, due to the energy crises. When prices dropped rapidly in the early 
1980’s, the program’s outlook changed dramatically. Exploration of frontier area’s 
such as offshore and Arctic,  strongly influenced by NEP under the Canada lands 
regulations,  came  to  a  near  standstill.  Lower  oil  prices  meant  exploration  and 
production costs would grossly exceed expected revenues. Arctic oil and gas, while 
still a very hot issue in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s116, was reduced to second 
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stage when oil prices decreased again.117  It simply was not economically viable to 
exploit Arctic oil reserves –yet.
Basically,  the  NEP  was  the  wrong  program  at  the  wrong  time.  It  made 
relations between the federal government and the provincial government of Alberta 
more problematic than they ever were and was a major stress-point in US-Canadian 
relations.  NEP  was  abolished  as  soon  as  the  Progressive-Conservative  Mulroney 
government came into power in 1984. In the course of about a year, measures were 
announced that would gradually but quickly abolish the newly founded federal taxes, 
liberalize oil  and gas prices, abolish PIP and replace it with an credit system not 
distinguishing between Canadian or foreign owned companies. The back-in clause 
was also abolished. All in all, the NEP had not existed longer than five years.118 Any 
return to these type of nationalistic policies was made impossible when the Mulroney 
government signed the US-Canadian Free Trade Agreement in 1988 and even more 
so  when  NAFTA  was  established  in  1993.119 Although  both  agreements  were 
controversial in Canada, export increased dramatically after they were implemented, 
although that was partly caused by a cheap Canadian dollar as well.120
The Mulroney government set out to deregulate much of the energy market, 
just  like  the  Reagan  Administration  in  the  US  had  begun  earlier.  The  Crown 
Corporation was largely privatized. Exports to the US rose sharply in the 1980s and 
1990s, with Canada exporting about half  of both its oil  and natural gas produce, 
virtually all of both to the United States. This amounted to 27% of total US energy 
imports in 2000. Some energy is exported from the US to Canada, although that flow 
is hardly significant compared to the southward one.121 The oil and gas mentioned, 
however, comes mainly from conventional sources, still mainly in Alberta. In a 1975 
report, the horizon for oil and gas reserves was set at 1995 at the latest, because 
after that, ‘the prospects are good, or at least by major effort not too long delayed  
can  be  made  good,  for  adequate  alternative  sources  of  energy.’122 Although 
considerable progress is made, it is clear that even now, these alternatives have not 
yet been able to replace oil as major source of energy in the world. It demonstrates 
also  that  actual  reserves  were  larger  than  presumed  a  few  decades  ago.
Canada  has  large  reserves  of  ‘unconventional’  oil.  The  most  important  of 
those  are  the  Albertan  Oil  Sands123:  sand  containing  heavy,  extremely  viscous 
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petroleum called  bitumen.  The  reserves  in  these  sands  are  huge.  Without  them 
Canada’s proven oil reserves would be some 5 billion barrels according to the US 
Energy Information Agency. With these sands added, Canadian reserves go up to as 
much as 175 billion barrels (and almost twice that  amount with future expected 
extraction technologies taken into account).124 Extraction, however, is difficult and 
requires  high  amounts  of  energy  and  water,  produces  a  lot  of  carbon  dioxide 
emissions and is very damaging to the environment.
Arctic  oil  and  gas,  although  looking  very  promising  during  the  oil  crises, 
seems not to have lived up to its promise. Extraction of Arctic oil and gas has proven 
to  be  far  more  difficult  and  expensive  than  thought  earlier.  Currently  the  only 
productive  oil  and natural  gas field north of  the Arctic  circle  in  north-America is 
Prudhoe bay in Alaska, although for some years Cameron Island in the Canadian 
Arctic has also yielded some small quantities of oil.
In  1969,  the  Alyeska  Pipeline  Service  Company,  a  consortium  of  several 
major oil companies, applied for a permit to construct a pipeline from Prudhoe Bay 
on the northern slope of Alaska to Valdez in the south. The so-called Trans-Alaskan 
Pipeline System (TAPS) runs some 800 miles through Alaska, ending in a sea port 
from where crude oil is transported to US West Coast refineries. A permit to build the 
line was given in 1973 and building was finished in 1977. The four years between 
Alyeska company’s applying for a permit and the permit being granted, heavy debate 
took  place  in  Congress  between  the  Alyeska  company,  government, 
environmentalists,  native  Alaskans,  politicians and lobbyists  with a wide range of 
backgrounds and interests.
In 1969, the National Environmental Policy Act had been signed, requiring an 
environmental impact statement for any ‘major federal action significantly affecting 
the environment’. An 800-mile hot-oil pipeline running through Arctic tundra, wildlife 
habitat  and  other  pristine  landscape  federally  owned,  seemed  to  fit  that 
description.125 However,  by  the  late  1960s,  oil  companies  were  used  to  getting 
government support and encouragement for their projects, not waiting years for a 
permit to be reviewed for possible environmental damage. The 1969 Santa Barbara 
oil blowout and consequential spill had changed legislator’s perspective to oil drilling, 
however.126 What ensued was a four-year process of writing a environmental impact 
statement, settling native Alaskans’ land claims and notably, a remarkable suspicious 
view of US politicians towards Canada.
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The  pipeline  runs  through  Arctic  and  semi-Arctic  tundra,  which  was 
problematic,  because the  crude  oil  transported through the pipeline  needs  to  be 
warmed in order to flow properly. This would lead to melting the permafrost soil and 
turning it into soft mud if the pipeline was buried, undermining the construction on 
which it is built. However, building the pipeline aboveground meant it would block 
migration  paths  of  animals  living  in  the  area.127 Meanwhile,  native  Alaskans 
successfully pushed claims to be compensated for use of their ancestral lands which 
the pipeline crossed. The proposed route of the pipeline worried many, since it would 
end in a sea-port rather than at an existing pipeline hub. Not only did this make 
environmentalists anxious, but it also worried politicians. And rightly so, it appeared 
in hindsight with the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in mind. This spill was caused by a 
ship transporting Prudhoe Bay oil  from the port of Valdez to the US west coast. 
Furthermore, the possibility existed that Alaskan oil would not be shipped to US west 
coast  refineries,  but  to  Japanese  ports,  were  oil  prices  were  much  higher.  This 
worried US politicians greatly.128 
A different pipeline route was proposed, running along the Mackenzie river to 
Winnipeg, Manitoba. This would link the pipeline up to the existing north American 
pipeline network, and it would run along the Mackenzie Valley pipeline Canada was 
planning.  This would mean that  no tanker shipping from the port of  Valdez was 
necessary. It would also mean a longer route though, with as much as 2000 miles 
running through Arctic and semi-Arctic terrain, instead of just 800 miles the Alaskan 
route would run through such terrain.129 The prospect of having the pipeline running 
partly through Canada was worrisome as well: ‘the mostly Canadian route sacrificed 
U.S. autonomy over the pipeline. Although hardly a Cold War adversary, Canada was 
still a different country, and trans-Alaska supporters argued that even close allies  
would come into conflict over how to divide the riches of such a wealth-producing  
enterprise,  especially  in  a  time  of  oil-market  shocks.’130 This  demonstrates  the 
amount of anxiety present in the US energy security debate during the early 1970s. 
When the permit for the Trans-Alaska Oil pipeline was finally granted in 1973, 
it was for the Alaska route, prohibiting Alaskan crude oil to be sold outside the US, 
and most notably, without any further need for environmental impact statements or 
other action required under NEPA. 
An episode of almost comparable complexity took place in Canada with the 
Mackenzie  Valley  Gas  Pipeline.  Shortly  after  oil  was  discovered  in  Prudhoe  Bay, 
natural gas was discovered in the Mackenzie Delta, eastwards of Prudhoe Bay on the 
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Canadian side of the border. The amounts of gas here were smaller than those found 
in Alaska, so a separate pipeline would be difficult to justify. Plans were made to join 
a possible Canadian gas pipeline with an Alaskan one, leading to the existing natural 
gas  pipe  network  in  Canada.  An  inquiry  was  set  up  to  assess  ‘the  social,  
environmental  and  economic  impact’131 of  the  pipeline.  After  20  months  of 
investigations, the National Energy Board rejected the application in 1976. Aboriginal 
groups and environmentalists opposed the pipeline, fearing it would not sustainably 
enhance aboriginals’ economic outlook and damage the Arctic environment.132
In 2004 the debate was re-opened and a new inquiry was started. By now, 
most aboriginal peoples were proponents of a gas line. Convened in the ‘Aboriginal 
Pipeline  Group’,  they  would  be  stakeholders  in  the  new  project,  able  to  exert 
influence in development, ownership and operation of the pipeline. Not all peoples 
agreed with that, though, as some peoples inhabiting lands along the pipeline’s route 
still oppose construction. The price of natural gas has risen over the last decades, 
making it an economically more lucrative commodity. The natural gas, although a 
relatively ‘clean’ fossil fuel, could be used to extract oil from the Albertan oil sands: a 
source of oil whose extraction is highly polluting. Unchanged over the last decades, is 
the  fact  that  the  main  stakeholders  in  the  project  would  be  American  oil 
companies.133 
Even though natural gas has increased in importance, the pipeline would still 
be economically more sound if combined with an Alaskan gas pipeline, because of 
the larger quantities of natural gas present in Alaska. Even the viability of an Alaskan 
pipeline is doubted, though.134 A number of possible routes exist for both pipelines, 
both with and without the possibility of linking up to each other. Both countries have 
not yet decided on the issue, so at this point the future of both planned pipelines 
remains uncertain.  
One area keeps showing up in Canadian-US energy relations: the Alaskan 
Arctic  National  Wildlife  Reserve  (ANWR).  East  of  Prudhoe  Bay  and  west  of  the 
Mackenzie  Delta,  this  area  is  completely  Alaskan,  but  is  close  to  the  Canadian 
border. On the northern coastal plain of the refuge, an oilfield is situated. Although 
even reaching this area is very challenging for a large part of the year, let alone 
drilling in it, the amount of oil is often considered to be so significant that drilling 
could be economically viable. The exact amount of oil present there is difficult to 
determine.  Practically  the  only reliable  source of  oil  reserve estimates  is  the  US 
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Geological Service (USGS). Their estimates vary strongly, depending on probability 
levels  of  a  certain  amount  of  oil  to  be  found,  based  on areas  with  comparable 
geological features. With probability levels varying from 5% to 50% and 95% and 
different types of estimates (difference is made between all available oil, technically 
recoverable oil and economically recoverable oil), in addition to the importance of 
global oil prices in determining the amount of oil economically recoverable, estimates 
vary as wildly as 2-32 billion barrels of oil available in the ANWR. According to some 
authors, this makes any estimate of oil reserves and thus the potential importance of 
ANWR ‘politically constructed’.135 Since wildly fluctuating estimates can all be justified 
in some way, these estimates  can easily  become more of a political  tool  than a 
reliable prediction.
The  ANWR  is  a  designated  wildlife  reserve  and  the  calving  ground  of 
Porcupine Caribou herds crucial  for the subsistence of the Gwich’in Inuit  living in 
Alaska and Canada. Fierce discussion abounds about possible drilling in the ANWR, 
since first plans for drilling were made in the early 1970s. In 1987, a US-Canadian 
agreement  on  the  conservation  of  the  porcupine  caribou  herd  was  signed, 
acknowledging the importance of the caribou for indigenous peoples and as a natural 
species requiring protection. Both countries agreed to cooperation on the matter: 
‘Where an activity in one country is determined to be likely to cause significant long-
term adverse impact on the Porcupine Caribou Herd or its habitat, the other Party  
will be notified and given an opportunity to consult prior to final decision.136 Canada 
has placed much emphasis on the Porcupine Caribou and Gwich’in issue. According 
to  one  author,  this  issue  is  ‘not  one  of  energy  for  Canada,  but  one  of  the  
environment and of aboriginal peoples’.137 Apart from that, stressing this issue may 
enhance  Canadian  credibility  in  circumpolar  cooperation,  which  is  centered for  a 
large  part  around  precisely  these  two  themes:  environmental  and  indigenous 
concerns.
Several times since the 1970s, permission to drill in the ANWR was granted 
by either House of Congress, but each time it was rejected again by the other House, 
or, as happened in 1996, by veto of the President. Behind the wish to drill for oil in 
the  remote  ANWR,  lies  the  desire  of  many  in  the  United  States  to  decrease 
dependence on foreign oil, especially from OPEC countries. It is hard to assess how 
much  the  energy  security  relation  of  the  US  would  benefit  from  ANWR  oil,  as 
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estimates on the amounts of oil in the reserve vary and exploitation would be very 
difficult given the Arctic climate.138
Many  argue  that  energy  security  would  be  better  served  with  energy 
efficiency measures, decreasing the almost 18 million barrels per day US the US 
consumes, which makes it the number one oil-consuming country in the world.139 
With Canada as the main foreign supplier of oil to the US, this emphasis on self-
sufficiency and security is of importance to the US-Canadian relationship. With the 
end  of  the  Cold  War  including  non-military  security  threats  into  the  security 
narrative, energy security became even more importatn.140 Any disruption of energy 
supply would be such a security threat. The idea hardly seems new, though. Already 
in the early 1970s, anxiety existed in the US over possible Canadian authority over 
the Alaskan pipeline. Apparently, if the need is high enough, any country can be a 
threat when it comes to that determining factor in the global economy that oil is. An 
added risk of damage to (or attacks on) pipelines providing the US with oil and gas is 
also included in the energy-security  debate. The Cold War, nor its ending hardly 
seems to have had a significant influence on US-Canadian energy relations.
Despite the existence of many transnational pipelines between the US and 
Canada, as well as many bi- or multinational energy companies and joint ventures 
between American  and  Canadian  companies,  a  certain  suspicion  seems to  exist, 
mainly  in  the United States,  towards  any country  when it  comes to  energy and 
energy imports. This suspicion is present in the whole described period, from the 
early  1970s to  the present.  It  became especially  strong during the years of  the 
Canadian NEP, when Canada showed unprecedented assertiveness and nationalism 
in energy matters in response to the worldwide oil crises. Afterwards, relationships 
relaxed again,  but the US always seems uncomfortable with its position of a net 
importer.
The  US-Canadian  energy  relationship  is  perhaps  the  clearest  example  of 
mutual interdependence. Canada needs the US in an economic sense as the main 
foreign consumer of Canadian produced oil  and gas.  The US needs Canada as a 
reliable partner to import oil and gas from. With NEP, Canada showed more initiative 
in energy policy than in most other areas described in this thesis. This reflects their 
strong position in the energy field. NEP was not long-lived, though. In the end, a new 
political climate in Canada, notably more inclined to cooperation with the US than the 
one it replaced, combined with US and domestic protest ended the program after 
only a few short years. 
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The Arctic was important in Canadian energy policy mainly during the NEP 
years. Exploration and production in the difficult but resource-rich areas was actively 
promoted under NEP. When oil  prices dropped again however, Arctic  oil  and gas 
became commercially unviable for the most part. The only significant Arctic oilfield 
remains US Prudhoe Bay in Alaska. This single case, however, hardly does anything 
to structurally alter US policy on the Arctic. 
Despite their strong position vis-à-vis the US, Canada could not, or would not, 
maintain policies that angered the US for long. As to Canadian opposition to drilling 
in  the  ANWR,  their  reaction  is  reactive,  but  stems  from a  strong  position.  The 
outcome of this controversy remains yet to be seen.
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Chapter 4: Environment and regional governance
Environmental protection is clearly an issue were national boundaries are of little 
consequence  and  international  cooperation  is  necessary.  With  the  Arctic  as  an 
multinational,  exceptionally  large  area  of  somewhat  comparable  environmental 
conditions  around  the  globe,  it  is  not  surprising  to  see  examples  of  bi-  and 
multilateral  cooperation  being  established  early  on.  One  of  the  first  of  such 
cooperation projects was the 1911 Convention for the Preservation and Protection of 
Fur  Seals.  Under  this  Convention,  hunting  for  fur  seals  was  only  permitted  for 
Indigenous peoples, hunting for subsistence purposes in traditional ways.141 Revised 
in 1957, the Convention continued to operate until 1984, when the US failed to ratify 
a protocol to extend its operation for another four years.142 Presumably, this was 
because  of  environmentalist  groups  opposing  an  agreement  in  which  any  wild 
animals were allowed to be killed.143
Protection  of  nature  and  regional  cooperation,  therefore,  are  comfortably 
connected to each other. However, a lot has changed in environmental protection 
since the 1911 Convention protecting a single species from over hunting. The Arctic 
environmental  agenda  has  evolved  from  relatively  straightforward  initiatives  in 
wildlife  protection  and  hunt  regulation  to  becoming  part  of  a  new  definition  of 
security, and has broadened to encompass global phenomena such as pollution (not 
necessarily in the Arctic), ozone depletion, acidification and most recently, climatic 
change.  International  cooperation  on  these  topics  has  increased  from  bi-  and 
multilateral  agreements  to  a  widely  acknowledged  regional  governance  structure 
with its own unique features, accents and omissions. Although this cooperation has 
involved all eight Arctic states, the roles of both Canada and the United States are 
especially important in the process. Canada has often been the leading country in 
circumpolar  cooperation  initiatives,  while  the  US  has  its  own,  more  issue-based 
outlook. This makes US-Canadian relations on these issues interesting, since, once 
again, both countries are very much interdependent in their policy possibilities and 
aims, which is an important influence in the outcome of the different circumpolar 
cooperation initiatives discussed here. The new post-Cold War security narrative has 
been crucial in this field, opening up possibilities for cooperation and providing a new 
framework for especially circumpolar relations.
Although  environmental  concerns  have  sprung  up  all  over  the  world, 
especially since the 1970s, it’s no wonder that an early form of these issues were 
already addressed in the 1910s in the Arctic. The Arctic environment is especially 
141 Joyner, C. ‘United States Legislation’ p.275
142 Rothwell, D. ‘International Law and the Protection of the Arctic Environment’ in: ‘International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 44’ (1995) p. 290
143 Young, O. ‘Arctic Politics: Conflict and Cooperation in the Circumpolar North’ (Hanover, 1992) p.184
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vulnerable compared to other regions, given the difficult climatic situation and the 
amount of adjustment necessary for any life to flourish there.
The earliest recognized environmental risk is that of threatened polar species 
such  as  fish  stocks,  whales,  polar  bears  and  fur  seals.  From  the  1970s  on, 
environmental protection gained in importance and scope in international politics. Air 
pollution became an issue, as did the depletion of the ozone layer, acidification and 
acid rain some years later. 144
Acidification of Canadian Arctic and semi-Arctic waters have been an irritant 
in Canadian-US relations in the 1980s and early 1990. Midwestern heavy industry 
and energy plants caused water in Canadian lakes to become more acidic. Under the 
Reagan Administration, the problem was largely denied, much to the irritation of 
Canadian environmentalists and policy makers. Prime Minister Mulroney spoke out on 
the subjects against Reagan, but was unable to have a serious effect. Laws limiting 
pollution  and  acidification  were  already  in  place  in  the  US,  but  they  were  not 
enforced  until  the  1990s.  Although  the  process  of  acidification  is  still  going  on, 
attention  has  for  a  large  part  shifted  to  the  interlinked  climate  change,  making 
acidification less prominent on the political agenda.145
Also of more recent date are concerns with externally produced pollutants and 
climatic  change.  Although  most  research  –and  political  controversy-  on  global 
warming is very recent and falling outside the scope of this thesis, the notion of 
climatic change and greenhouse gas emissions has been present in environmental 
discourse for longer, especially for the Arctic region.
Climatic change, higher average temperatures and receding and thinning of 
the polar ice pack have been registered for some decades.146 Climatic change has 
gone faster and has been more far-reaching in the Arctic than in most other places 
on the globe. Air pollution and soot from industrial activity in  and near the Arctic has 
darkened the ice cap, making it less reflective and more absorbent of solar heat. The 
same effect  is  found  when  the  dark  ground  becomes  visible  under  the  thinning 
icecap,  which helps warm the ground and melt  permafrost.  This  self-accelerating 
process is one of the reasons climatic change has been so visible in the Arctic. A 
thinner ice cap reduces the habitat of polar bears, makes hunting for indigenous 
peoples more difficult as ice conditions become less predictable migratory patterns of 
Arctic mammals are disrupted and vegetation patterns change. Melting glaciers and 
land-ice also raise the average sea-level. Warmer temperatures push more species 
144 Rothwell, D. ‘International Law’ p. 289-293
145 Herd Thompson, J. and Randall, S. ‘Canada and the United States’  p. 279-281
146 Recently, this issue has become highly controversial. Leaving the question of determining the origins of 
climatic changes (naturally occurring fluctuations, anthropogenic greenhouse-effect or a mix of both) 
to climatological experts, an overview of the witnessed effects on the Arctic is given here. International 
policy has been greatly influenced by these changes, no matter what the exact causes have been.
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northward,  sometimes  replacing  exclusively  Arctic  species  with  those  originating 
from sub-Arctic habitats. Navigation of Arctic waters becomes at once better possible 
and more treacherous, as known constellations of multi-year ice melt, change and 
get adrift and uncharted, seasonal ice drifts into the ice-infested waterways of the 
Arctic.147
Another more recent realization is that the Arctic is an importer of pollutants 
produced  elsewhere.  Through  sea  and  air  currents,  radionuclides  and  so-called 
Persistent  Organic  Pollutants  (POPs),  such  as  pesticides  and  chemicals  are 
transported to the Arctic region. There, low temperatures can create a ‘cold trap’, 
preventing or slowing down further transportation and degradation. Thus, the Arctic 
becomes a ‘sink’ for polluting substances. POPs are especially problematic, due to 
their  persistent  nature:  these  substances  are  not  or  hardly  degradable  even  in 
optimal  conditions.  These substances,  together with heavy metals,  accumulate  in 
blood  and  body  fat  of  Arctic  animals,  thus  spreading  through  the  food  chain. 
Canadian Inuit, especially infants depending on breast milk, have been shown to be 
especially vulnerable to these pollutants as these Indigenous peoples rely on Arctic 
animals for their diet. Polar bears, another species at the top of the Arctic food chain, 
have also been affected.148
The trans boundary nature of environmental issues has been one of the main 
reasons for the development of several regional governance initiatives in the Arctic. 
As  a  relatively  unpoliticized  field,  environmental  concerns  have  been  a  common 
cause for almost all Arctic nations and a reasonable starting point for cooperation. 
However, a new, post-Cold War concept of security has, at the same time, put the 
issue on the international agenda, this has largely been in a remarkably cooperative, 
uncontesting way. 
Although  many  multi-  and  bilateral  agreements  on  specific  subjects  were 
already in place, the starting point for circumpolar governance is often placed with 
the 1987 ‘Murmansk initiative’ by Mikhail Gorbachev, named after the location of the 
speech in which it was presented in November of that year. Gorbachev called for 
international  cooperation  on  Arctic  environmental  protection:  ‘The  Soviet  Union 
proposes drawing up jointly  an integrated comprehensive plan for  protecting the  
natural  environment  of  the  North.’ 149 Although  Gorbachev  mainly  addressed 
northern European countries with his proposals for decreased military activity and 
147 Ebinger, C. and Zambetakis, E.: ‘The Geopolitics of Arctic Melt’ p. 1215, 1218
148 Schram Stokke, O. A Legal Regime for the Arctic? Interplay with the Law of the Sea Convention’ in: 
‘Marine Policy 31’ (2007) p. 404
149 Gorbachev, M. ‘Speech in Murmansk at the Ceremonial Meeting on the Occasion of the Presentation of  
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environmental  protection,  his  speech  set  wheels  in  motion  for  circumpolar 
cooperation on a larger scale.
The Arctic had been an important area in the Cold War security discourse, as 
we have seen in chapter 3. With the lessening of tension between east and west and 
the end of the Cold War, a new concept of ‘human security’ was developed, focusing 
not so much on strategic security as on security of human life in general. With the 
former  Cold  War adversaries  now on less hostile  footing  with  one another,  true 
globalization became a possibility.  Globalization also triggered a surge in regional 
cooperation, centered around the new security narrative and prompted by the new 
openness in world politics. However, traditional political concerns and anxieties were 
also behind the new cooperation initiatives. The Cold War may have thawed, but 
decades of distrust were not easily overcome. One author notes:  ‘The [Murmansk] 
initiative  was  one way for  the  Soviet  Union to  build  up cooperation  in  order  to  
develop its offshore industry in the Barents Sea without having to turn directly to the  
USA.’150 Cooperation on a regional  level  meant that  the two former superpowers 
would not always have to engage in difficult and uncomfortable bilateral contact, but 
could benefit from the influence of other, perhaps more moderate states.
After Gorbachev first proposed circumpolar cooperation, other Arctic countries 
then took up the initiative. Although Gorbachev addressed many Arctic issues in his 
speech, including strategic security and non-proliferation, environmental protection 
was the only issue seriously taken up by other Arctic states. This is understandable, 
as it was a relatively uncontroversial subject.151 In 1991, a Finnish proposal from 
1989  lead  to  the  establishment  of  the  Arctic  Environmental  Protection  Strategy 
(AEPS). All  eight Arctic states signed the Declaration in Rovaniemi (Finland). The 
AEPS outlined existing cooperation and issues and proposed responses to several 
problems. AEPS had five major objectives: 
‘i) To protect the Arctic ecosystem, including humans; 
ii)  To  provide  for  the  protection,  enhancement  and  restoration  of  
environmental  quality  and the  sustainable  utilization  of  natural  resources,  
including their use by local populations and indigenous peoples in the Arctic;
 iii)  To  recognize  and,  to  the  extent  possible,  seek  to  accommodate  the  
traditional and cultural needs, values and practices of the indigenous peoples  
as  determined  by  themselves,  related  to  the  protection  of  the  Arctic  
environment; 
iv) To review regularly the state of the Arctic environment; 
150 Keskitalo, C. ‘International Region-building’ p.195
151 Ibid. p. 196
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v) To identify, reduce, and, as a final goal, eliminate pollution.’152
What immediately stands out in this list in the importance of indigenous peoples. 
Three out of the five stated objectives deal with the people living in the Arctic, and 
objective iii centers around indigenous peoples. Although the only signatories of the 
declaration  are  the  eight  Arctic  countries,  indigenous  peoples’  organizations  are 
mentioned  in  the  documents  as  observers,  together  with  observers  states,  UN 
organizations  and a scientific  organization.  AEPS was an example  of  a  ‘soft  law’ 
regime: it was  not a legally binding agreement, there was no legal status to any 
outcome of the strategy. AEPS was an advisory, not a regulatory body. 
AEPS identified six major environmental threats to the Arctic: POPs (called 
Persistent  Organic  Contaminants  in  the  Declaration),  oil  pollution,  heavy  metals, 
noise, radioactivity and acidification. Four working groups were formed to carry out 
the  research  and  advisory  tasks  of  AEPS:  the  Arctic  Monitoring  and  Assessment 
Program (AMAP), Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), Emergency 
Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR) and Conservation of Arctic Flora and 
Fauna (CAFF).153 The AEPS was governed through bi-annual ministerial meetings and 
administered by civil servants.154
Several problems and deficiencies were identified with AEPS. The regime was 
fragmented, partly because of its non-binding nature. AEPS acknowledged existing 
conventions, but these individual conventions were not always accepted by all Arctic 
states. Any legal obligations under these conventions were uncertain, and AEPS did 
nothing  to  change  that.  This  is  linked  to  another  major  problem:  the  fact  that 
separate  conventions  had  been  created  for  different  problems.  AEPS  did  not 
amalgamate  them in any way,  but  realization  struck  more and more that  many 
environmental issues are in fact intertwined. A comprehensive regime was not in 
place,  nor  created.155 Some issues were also  not  adequately  addressed in  AEPS, 
partly  because  of  this  fragmentation.  Trans  boundary  pollution  and  attention  to 
pollution  produced  in  more  southern  areas  which  affected  the  Arctic,  were 
insufficiently addressed.156
Due to the ‘soft law’ nature of the AEPS, individual states enjoined a lot of 
freedom in developing domestic standards for environmental protection measures. 
This lead to differences in scope and style of implementation. Canada freed up some 
$100  million  for  Arctic  research  and  cleanup  operations  in  1991,  making  it  the 
country ‘best placed to meet its domestic obligations under the Strategy’157, for as far 
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as any obligations can be identified under AEPS. The US at the same time, was 
willing, under the newly installed Clinton Administration, to address environmental 
issues,  although  a  review  of  Arctic  policy  delayed  the  actual  implementation  of 
AEPS.158
A call for a stronger, more comprehensive circumpolar cooperation initiative 
came up, mainly from Canada. Canadian interest in the Arctic had been great for 
some decades. This was partly due to sovereignty concerns discussed in chapter 1 of 
this thesis. Partly also, it was because of the large number of indigenous peoples 
living in the Canadian Arctic who were going through an emancipation process in this 
period. Lastly, it was part of a national identity-building process focusing on Canada 
as a ‘northern’ Country. Canada had been very important in establishing and defining 
the  AEPS,  which  is  considered  by  some  authors  to  strongly  reflect  a  Canadian 
perspective.159 Although  calls  for  an  ‘Arctic  Council’  had  been  made  by  (mainly) 
Canadian scholars  and NGO’s for  some decades, the initiative  finally  got political 
support in 1989, when Prime Minister Mulroney proposed it in a speech to Soviet 
polar specialists. In 1991 a report on the possible establishment of an Arctic council 
was produced, two months before the AEPS declaration was signed.160 The following 
years, the initiative was further developed, mainly in Canada. Authors seem to agree 
that a Canadian perspective is reflected in the ensuing organization.
In September 1996, the Arctic Council Declaration was signed in Ottawa by all 
eight Arctic States also signatory to AEPS. The Arctic Council was defined as a ‘high 
level forum’, rather than an authority with legally binding powers. It incorporated all 
AEPS activities, but was broader in scope. Just like its predecessor, the Arctic Council 
is  a  clear  case of  a  soft  law institution.  At  the signing  of  the AEPS declaration, 
indigenous peoples organizations had been mere observers. For the Arctic Council, a 
category  of  ‘permanent  participants’  was  created for  these organization  and any 
other organization representing  ‘a single indigenous people resident in more than  
one Arctic  State; or more than one Arctic  indigenous people resident in a single  
Arctic  state’  this  category  was created with  the  intention  to  ‘provide  for  active 
participation and full consultation with the Arctic indigenous representatives within  
the Arctic Council’.161 A separate observer category was created for non-Arctic states, 
intergovernmental organizations and NGO’s.
The  Arctic  Council  fully  incorporated  AEPS,  expanded  the  importance  of 
indigenous  peoples,  and  added  a  focus  on sustainable  development  through  the 
introduction of a new working group on that topic: the Working Group on Sustainable 
158  Ibid.
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Development (WGSD). The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment is also a new initiative 
from the Arctic Council. Although the Arctic Council would be open to address any 
‘common Arctic issue’, the issue of ‘military security’ was explicitly mentioned not to 
be within the scope of the Council.
Although the important role of indigenous peoples, the regional outlook and 
the focus on sustainable development are often viewed as being Canadian in outlook. 
The soft  law character  and explicit  exemption of military  issues reflect  American 
concerns in the Council’s design. For northern European countries, the question of 
dealing with indigenous peoples is not as pressing as it is in North America. In the 
case of the Scandinavian Saami, these differences with north American indigenous 
peoples  are  telling.  In  northern  Europe,  areas  are  generally  smaller,  indigenous 
peoples have for  centuries integrated with immigrants  from the south and many 
traditional industries (mainly reindeer herding) are not at all subsistence-based, but 
rather industrialized and commercial.162 In Canada and the US, indigenous peoples 
are  not at  all  as  integrated into  mainstream society.  Native  peoples are  a large 
minority  in  Alaska  and  comprise  the  majority  of  inhabitants  of  the  northern 
territories of Canada. Land claims and self-governance have been important issues in 
both Canada and the US for decades. After a painful period of forced integration, 
Canada has been actively seeking land settlements, political emancipation and some 
form of self-governance for the last decades of the 20th century. The attention given 
to ‘active participation and full consultation’ found in the Arctic Council declaration 
clearly reflects that.
Regional  governance  initiatives  would  have  been  attractive  to  Canada, 
providing  them with  policy  tools  and  institutions   that  allowed  Canadian  policy-
makers to cooperate with other countries,  instead of placing them in their  usual 
difficult position vis-à-vis the United States. Being ‘not alone’ could offer Canadian a 
stronger  position  and  a  leading  role  in  the  formulation  of  compromise  and 
consensus.163 As  stated  in  a  1997  Canadian  report  on  circumpolar  cooperation: 
‘Canada could be uniquely  positioned to  build  bridges between the various polar  
perspectives –North American and Euro-Arctic (Nordic and Russian), aboriginal and  
non-native,  state  and  nongovernmental,  national  and  regional’.164 Also,  the  new 
emphasis  on  sustainable  development  was  a  subject  Canada  promoted 
wholeheartedly in many international issues. To apply it to the Canadian priority area 
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of the Arctic was a very comfortable fit. Canada had, in short, an opportunity to 
assume a leading position in an international field that was domestically important.
However, US influence can also be clearly identified in the design of the Arctic 
Council.  Apart  from its  broader  focus,  the  Arctic  Council  operated much  like  its 
predecessor: decisions are made in bi-annual ministerial meetings, daily operations 
are conducted by states’ civil servants. The Arctic Council does not have binding legal 
power, but gives out non-binding declarations and advise. The Council does not have 
its own secretariat or budget. It is financed on an ad-hoc basis. Chairmanship of the 
Council  changes at  every ministerial  meeting,  giving all  member states two-year 
chairing positions. The chairing country provides secretariat services.165 The lack of 
any  formal  treaty,  regulatory  and  executive  power,  permanent  secretariat  and 
funding makes the Council legally weak, but also more flexible. Perhaps that point is 
not irrelevant given the ‘shifting and hard to forecast circumstances prevailing in the  
Arctic’.166 This was an objective for the US during the establishment of the Council.167 
This way, the US (as do all  member states) have a maximum of policy freedom, 
while benefiting from the advantages of cooperation in research and advise.
The explicit exception of military issues and the overall avoidance of politically 
controversial issues can also be seen as a point especially important to the US. Since 
US politicians highly value policy freedom, the soft law nature was key to US support 
for the Council, since the US often has  ‘extreme difficulty ratifying legally binding  
agreements that seem relatively uncontroversial’,  something that can be seen in the 
failure of the US to ratify UNCLOS as well. 168 The  differences  in  the  level  of 
ambition for  the Arctic  Council  between the US and Canada are telling.  Regional 
governance is an important factor in Canadian Arctic policy, especially since the end 
of the Cold War. For the US however, a preferred low-profile Arctic Council reflects 
the low importance of a general, overarching Arctic policy in the US. 
Although some Arctic issues have gained in importance in US policy in the last 
decade  of  the  20th century,  a  comprehensive  Arctic  outlook  has  never  been 
developed. The Arctic was important in Cold War security policy, is important when it 
comes to  energy,  and is  seriously  considered in  environmental  issues  and  when 
native  peoples  are  concerned,  but  all  these  issues  remain  separate.  One  of  the 
reasons for this is the fact that many issues concerning the Arctic are not nationally 
relevant, but are (almost) only relevant for Alaska. As a single state, Alaska has less 
to win in circumpolar cooperation than in investing in the relationship with the lower 
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48. US involvement in regional Arctic cooperation is divided over two levels: state 
and federal.169 This is not to say that the federal government or the government of 
Alaska is not cooperative or disinterested in the Arctic Council. Many initiatives are 
supported by either government, but these are usually approached in a somewhat 
ad-hoc manner, lacking an overall policy. The need for regional governance in areas 
other than environmental protection is also hardly or not at all  recognized in the 
US.170
For Canada, the ‘North’ is much more important in the national identity. A 
‘Northern’ foreign policy overarching any individual Arctic  issues can be identified 
from the 1990’s onwards. The general policy objectives of this northern policy are 
‘first, to enhance the security and prosperity of Canadians, especially northerners  
and Aboriginal peoples; second, to assert and ensure the preservation of Canada’s  
sovereignty in  the North; third,  to establish  the Circumpolar  region as a vibrant  
geopolitical entity integrated into a rules-based international system; and fourth, to  
promote the human security of northerners and the sustainable development of the  
Arctic’ 171
A  notable  exception  is  one  topic  perceived  as  strictly  bilateral:  that  of 
acidification of (Canadian) waters due to (mainly)  US industry and power plants’ 
pollution. Canada has not been able to convince the US to effectively enforce its 
existing  legislation.  In  this  case,  Canada  had  relatively  small  leverage  and  was 
unable to convince the US to act. Change only came when environmental concerns 
became more  important  in  US policy  during  the  Clinton  years,  independently  of 
Canadian pressure. 
Although  Canadian  policy  makers  prefer  a  broader  scope  for  the  Arctic 
Council,  they  too  avoid  politically  sensitive  subjects,  although  given  the  high 
importance  of  circumpolar  cooperation  in  the  Canadian  policy  discourse,  this  is 
probably more due to pragmatic reasons than their own desire. An Arctic Council 
without US (and perhaps Russian) participation would be utterly toothless. Emphasis 
is put on issues like trade and economic development, education and employment 
mobility.172 Topics perhaps not completely uncontroversial, but all possible to address 
without much political contestation.
This issue brings us back to the situation observed in many other fields as 
well: the overall interdependence of Canadian-US relations, with the US as the senior 
partner.  Both  the  US  and  Canada  acknowledge  the  importance  of  regional 
cooperation, at least in some areas. For Canada, circumpolar cooperation has been a 
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golden opportunity to assume an international leading role. In practice, however, the 
very  much  ‘Canadian-flavored’  initiatives  have  also  been  largely  defined  by  US 
demands for a lower-profile, non-binding character. Both the Arctic Council and the 
earlier AEPS would hardly have been worth the effort had the US (or indeed any 
Arctic state) not been willing to join them. Literature suggest though, that the soft 
law nature of both regional initiatives was explicitly an American demand. Even when 
in a leading and largely determining role, Canada could not ignore US interests. In 
the end, these became perhaps as much of a determining factor in the AEPS and 
Arctic Council as the Canadian influence in them.
The  end  of  the  Cold  War  has  been  an  important  trigger  for  regional 
cooperation. The new security narrative freed the way for regional cooperation with 
all  circumpolar  states,  including  Russia.  Environmental  protection  had  already 
become a priority earlier, but was then taken on board the issue best suited to start 
with in the new circumpolar regime.
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Conclusion
This  thesis  set  out to assess the US-Canadian relationship concerning the Arctic, 
analyzing  the  situation  in  the  last  decade of  the Cold War compared to  the fist 
decade after its ending. A complicated picture emerges, one in which both countries 
are intimately dependent upon one another, yet enjoy different amounts of policy 
freedom. The US obviously emerges as the most powerful side of the relationship, 
although Canada is by no means powerless.
We have seen that in several conflicts, the end result is usually not exactly 
the  situation  dreamed of  by  Washington.  Rather,  Canadian  politicians  and policy 
makers repeatedly show a great amount of creativity and pragmatism in finding a 
solution  both  countries  are  content  with  –often  resulting  in  a  completely  new 
situation. The status quo is not returned to, nor is a median position found. Rather, 
something radically else happens in which, notably, Canada gets its way to a larger 
extent than might be expected from a situation arising from a conflict with a state as 
powerful as the USA. 
In  the  case  of  the  contested  sovereignty  over  the  Northwest  Passage 
discussed  in  chapter  1,  the  standoff  was  eventually  (temporarily)  resolved when 
Canada  adopted  new  (at  the  time  revolutionary)  environmental  legislation: 
legislation the USA respected, albeit somewhat grudgingly perhaps.173 Ultimately, a 
situation in which both parties agree to disagree ensues, while Canada has managed 
to establish a form of ‘pragmatic sovereignty’ with the added implementation of the 
voluntary NORDREG system to regulate shipping in the Arctic waters. The dispute 
over  the Beaufort  sea boundary  remains unresolved and dormant.  Clearly,  these 
territorial  issues  are  more  important  to  Canadian  policy  makers  than  to  their 
American counterparts. However, the fact that the US has been unwilling to give in, 
indicates that this Arctic issue is relevant to them, even when mainly as a potential 
precedent. The end of the Cold War does not seem to have had a great influence on 
these bilateral issues, although the strategic importance of the NWP has decreased 
with the Soviet threat disappearing.
In  continental  security,  the  US  desperately  needed  Canada  to  defend  its 
(northern) borders in order to keep the continent safe during the Cold War. Canada 
was  unable  to  provide  for  the  complete  defense  of  its  territory  on  its  own,  so 
cooperation was essential. In the end, both countries got what they aimed for: the 
US  reached  its  goal  of  improved  continental  security,  Canada  gained  defense 
infrastructure on a scale and a level of sophistication it could never have afforded on 
its own. This seems the only topic from the chosen four were the Arctic seemed to 
have a higher priority for the US than for Canada. The US assumed the initiative for 
173  Rothwell, D. ‘International Law’p. 286
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continental security. Obviously, the end of the Cold War dramatically changed the 
strategic  security  outlook.  After  1989,  defense  cooperation  continued,  also  on 
continental  security,  but  the  Arctic  decreased  dramatically  in  relevance  with  the 
disappearance of the Soviet threat from the north.
The closest interdependence between Canada and the US can be seen in the 
field  of  energy.  Small  wonder  that  nationalistic,  protectionist  policies  in  Canada 
sparked a conflict with the US, Canada’s most important energy consumer. When US 
pressure and a change in the Canadian political climate lead to the abolition of  the 
short-lived  NEP,  the  ensuing  situation  was  one  where  a  far  larger  part  of  the 
Canadian energy sector was Canadian-owned than before. American companies on 
the other hand, were fully able to make use of the opportunities in Canada again. 
The  end  of  the  Cold  War  strengthened  the  already  existing  notion  that  energy 
security was in fact part of national security. This makes energy policy a sensitive 
topic, and helps explain both countries’ apprehension towards each other (or indeed 
any other country). The relevance of the Arctic in energy production is difficult to 
asses. The US Prudhoe Bay oilfield is a significant source of oil, but other estimates 
sources of Arctic oil and gas are as yet hard to exploit in an economically viable way. 
Environmental cooperation in the Arctic has a long and fruitful past. In the 
1970s and 1980s, environmental concerns became more important, especially for 
the vulnerable Arctic. A new security narrative included environmental issues in its 
scope and made cooperation in this field more of a priority, especially in Canada. 
When the end of the Cold War lead to a new regional outlook in many circumpolar 
states,  Canada  took  full  opportunity  of  the  US’  reluctance  to  embrace  the  new 
circumpolar narrative, giving Canada a leading position in this field, even defining the 
new ‘Arctic vision’.174 This has made the Arctic even more of a priority for Canada, as 
they have assumed this international leading role. The US’ international power and 
influence  have,  however,  also  greatly  influenced  the  way  in  which  circumpolar 
cooperation has taken shape. In this instance, the US and Canada ‘switch sides’: 
Canada has taken initiative and the US reacts and changes the outcome significantly.
The ‘icy grip’ both countries have on each other means that both are highly 
dependent on one another. Neither country can dictate the other’s policy or direction. 
The USA is usually more powerful and can protest against Canadian initiatives and 
actions, something which Canada is usually not capable of. 175 However, Canada does 
not have to bow to the US’ wishes: they have leverage of their own, and know how 
to use it. 
174  Shadian, J. ‘In Search of an Identity’ p. 324 
175  James, P. and Kasoff, M. (eds.) ‘Canadian Studies in the New Millennium’ (Toronto, 2008) p.257
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Since the signing of the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 1987 and 
the following tri-national North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993, 
both  Canada  and  the  US  (and  Mexico)  have  given  up  some  freedom  in  their 
(economic)  policy  in  order  to  make  free  trade  possible  in  all  of  North  America. 
According to some, this economic integration has meant that Canada and Mexico 
have had to adjust to the American standard, thus giving up more policy freedom 
than the US.176 Other argue that while Canada and the US get more economically 
integrated,  they  also  grow more  politically  distinct.177 While  it  seems  difficult  to 
distinguish  economic  policy  from  politics,  both  theses  predict  the  mutual 
interdependence of both countries to grow even stronger in the future. Canada has 
shown not to give up policy freedom easily, so a mere ‘adjusting to the American 
model’ seems overly simplistic.
Concluding, the picture of an icy grip where both countries are dependent on 
one another and have a strong influence over each other seems correct. Canada is 
not a meek, powerless ‘smaller power’ in the relationship, nor is the US limitless in 
its power over its smaller neighbor. The relationship is unequal, though, giving the 
US more possibilities to take initiative than Canada. The end of the Cold War has 
done  nothing  to  change  this  basic  structure  of  the  relationship,  it  has,  however 
changed  policies  on  both  sides  in  some  areas.  What  has  become  clear  in  this 
analysis, is that at least concerning the Arctic, Canada and the US are intimately 
connected to each other. Neither country can act completely unilaterally, but levels 
of policy freedom vary. Canada may be a junior partner, but it still has significant 
power in all discussed issues. Canada, it seems, is far more than just ‘America’s hat’.
176   Maclean, G. (ed.)‘Canada and the United States’ p.23
177  James, P. and Kasoff, M. (eds.) ‘Canadian Studies’ p.63
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